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Abstract
The increase in bandwidth over processing power has made stateful intrusion detection for
high-speed networks more diﬃcult, and, in certain cases, impossible. The problem of real-
time stateful intrusion detection in high-speed networks cannot be solved by optimizing
the packet matching algorithm used by a centralized process or by using custom-developed
hardware. Instead, there is a need for a parallel approach that is able to decompose the
problem into subproblems of manageable size.
In this thesis, we present a novel parallel matching algorithm for the signature-based detec-
tion of network attacks. The algorithm is able to perform stateful signature matching and
has been implemented on oﬀ-the-shelf hardware. The initial experiments conﬁrm that by
parallelizing the rule matching process it is possible to achieve a scalable implementation
of a stateful, network-based intrusion detection system.






In recent years, networks have evolved from a mere means of communication to a ubiquitous
computational infrastructure. Networks have become larger, faster, and highly dynamic.
In particular, the Internet, the world-wide TCP/IP network, has become a mission-critical
infrastructure for governments, companies, and ﬁnancial institutions. As a consequence,
network attacks have started to impact practical aspects of our lives.
Today's networks are very heterogeneous environments where highly-critical software ap-
plications (e.g., the control system for a dam) run side-by-side with other non-critical
network-based applications (e.g., a mail server). As a consequence, network-based attacks
against apparently non-critical services may produce unforeseen side eﬀects of devastating
proportions.
1.1.1 Growth in the Internet and Insecurity
The Internet is a network of networks composed of a set of autonomous subnetworks. The
Internet has an open architecture and it is composed of diﬀerent administrative domains
with diﬀerent (and possibly conﬂicting) goals. Governments, companies, universities and
organizations rely on the Internet to perform mission-critical tasks.
The story of the Internet began back in the 60s on the world's ﬁrst packet switching
network at the National Physics Laboratory in the United Kingdom. A few years later, the
DARPA (Defense Advanced Research Project Agency) developed the ARPANet (Advanced
Research Projects Agency Network), and many others followed since then.
By the end of 1969, the ARPANet had 4 sites: UCLA (University of California, Los An-
geles), SRI (Stanford Research Institute), (Menlo Park), UCSB (University of California,
Santa Barbara) , and the University of Utah. The IMP (Interface Message Processors) were
built around Honeywell 516 computers, and were linked using dedicated 55 Kbps phone
lines.
The ARPANet moved to TCP/IP on January 1st 1983, and, after that, DARPA funded the
development of Berkeley UNIX, which used a TCP/IP implementation, that introduced
1
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the socket programming abstraction.
In more recent years, the ARPANet became a subset of the Internet and the NSF (Na-
tional Science Foundation) deployed a supercomputer network, NSFNET (National Science
Foundation NETwork) that created a backbone of high speed links (56Kbps links in 1986)
During the 90s the Internet grew considerably in both size and traﬃc volume and starting
from the mid '90s it became a full-ﬂedged mass media, when Tim Berners-Lee (CERN)
created the World-Wide Web.
In the past ten years the Internet has become the most important means of communica-
tion. Unfortunately, as the infrastructure and services have evolved so have the hype and
sophistication of the attacks.
Table 1.1 reports a comparison between the growth of the Internet and the growth in
insecurity. Discarding a conspicuous initial lag, the pace of security incidents and reported
vulnerabilities has been catching up in the last years.
Today computer networks play a fundamental role in every kind of software-based attack.
In addition, most of the attacks focus on the networks themselves, rather than simply using
them as a communication channel.
1.1.2 The Plague of Software Bugs




When a system lacks one or more of this requirements it is deemed insecure. This often
happens because of some mistake done at some level in the development and deployment
process.
The IEEE Standard Glossary of Software Engineering Terminology [otCSotI90] deﬁnes bug
(or fault) as:
an incorrect step, process, or data deﬁnition in a computer program when a
fault gets triggered, it might generate a failure.
Bugs create unexpected behaviors that can possibly lead to a vulnerability [Wik07c]. A
vulnerability is a weakness in a system allowing an attacker to violate (by means of an
exploit) its conﬁdentiality, integrity or availability.
Some applications might work as designed but they contain vulnerabilities. Broadening the
concept of bug, security problems can arise when systems are utilized out of the scope for
which they were designed or when conﬁgured in an unsafe manner (i.e., a strong authen-
tication system with an easily-guessable default password)
There is a large number of generic security vulnerabilities produced by bad coding prac-
tices or design ﬂaws. The Security Portal for Information System Security Professionals
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Date Hosts Reported Incidents Reported
Vulnerabilities
Dec 1969 4 - -
Sep 1971 18 - -
Dec 1973 31 - -
Oct 1974 49 - -
Jan 1976 63 - -
Mar 1977 111 - -
Aug 1981 213 - -
May 1982 235 - -
Aug 1983 562 - -
Oct 1984 1024 - -
Oct 1985 1,961 - -
Feb 1986 2308 - -
Dec 1987 28,174 - -
Oct 1988 56,000 6 -
Oct 1989 159,000 132 -
Oct 1990 313,000 252 -
Oct 1991 617,000 406 -
Oct 1992 1,136,000 773 -
Oct 1993 2,056,000 1,334 -
Oct 1994 3,864,000 2,340 -
Jul 1995 8,200,000 2,412 171
Jul 1996 16,729,000 2,573 345
Jul 1997 26,053,000 2,134 311
Jul 1998 36,739,000 3,734 262
Jul 1999 56,218,000 9,859 417
Jul 2000 93,047,785 21,756 1,090
Jul 2001 125,888,197 52,658 2,437
Jul 2002 162,128,493 82,094 4,129
Jan 2003 171,638,297 137,529 3,784
Table 1.1: Source: Internet Systems Consortium and CERT, http://www.kernelthread.
com/publications/security/net.html. Security numbers are for the entire year, and
only include those that were reported to CERT.
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[Inf06] reports a wide -although not exhaustive- classiﬁcation of common causes of security
vulnerabilities: most of them are directly related to software, and are caused by bad coding
or conﬁguration practices such as:
buﬀer overﬂows empty or common passwords
unexpected input mis-conﬁguration
unhandled input trust relationships
race conditions, protocol ﬂaws
default conﬁguration
These software ﬂaws can be found and exploited in server software, client applications, and
the operating system itself. Sometimes protocols are inherently ﬂawed and therefore any
applications making use of that speciﬁc protocol will be vulnerable.
Attackers exploit vulnerabilities in order to gain access to restricted information and ser-
vices or to simply widen their privileges. Attacks have been classiﬁed according to diﬀerent
characteristics, e.g., by the privilege level that the attacher can gain, by type of actions the
attacker performs, or by the technique utilized. A more precise taxonomy of attack types
can be found in the work of Arturo Servin [Ser05], and a more thorough analysis of attacks
will be carried on in Chapter 2.
In the last years, software engineers have become aware of the risks and security issues as-
sociated with the design, development, and deployment of network-based software [VM01]
because damages and losses deriving from attacks have been increasing signiﬁcantly. How-
ever, we are still far from a comprehensive solution to the security problem.
1.1.3 Losses and Damages Caused by Security Problems
The number of reported vulnerabilities have been increasing constantly, as reported by the
CERT [CER06a]
Every year, starting from 1996, the CSI (Computer Security Institute) with the partici-
pation of the San Francisco FBI Computer Intrusion Squad conducts a survey of security
incidents and practices in industry, government, and academia.
The 2006 CSI/FBI (Federal Bureau of Investigation) Computer Crime and Security Survey
[CSI06] reports that the estimated average loss per respondent is about $170,000, which
is an impressing amount even though it shows a decreasing trend with respect to previous
year (about $200,000)
The top four categories of losses as reported by the survey are:
1. viruses;
2. unauthorized access;
3. laptop or mobile hardware theft; and
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Virus contamination
Unauthorized access to information
Laptop or mobile hardware theft
Theft of proprietary information
Denial of service
Financial fraud
Insider abuse of Net access or e-mail
Telecom fraud
Bots (zombies) within the organization
System penetration by outsider
Phishing in which your organization was fraudulently represented as sender
Abuse of wireless network
Instant messaging misuse
Misuse of public Web applications
Sabotage of data network
Web site defacement
Password sniﬃng
Exploit you organization's DNS server
Other
Figure 1.1: Dollar amount losses by type. (Source : the 2006 CSI/FBI Computer Crime
and Security Survey [CSI06])
4. theft of proprietary information.
The four previous items accounted for nearly three-quarters (74.3 percent) of the total
losses as can be seen from Figure 1.1
From those data emerges that security is becoming a concrete concern in today's organiza-
tions. Security costs a lot to companies,and vulnerabilities represent risks that can possibly
become enormous losses. Therefore, they need to be mitigated in the most eﬀective way.
An extensive documentation on facts and statistics about computer security, viruses, and
loss of data due to computer complexity and/or viruses can be found here [Ans04]
1.1.4 Countermeasures to Attacks
In the previous sections we have seen the extent and impact of security vulnerabilities in
networked systems. It could be argued that since the causes of most security problems are
well known, the solution to those problems would be simply to avoid those causes to occur.
This is somehow true, but infeasible. In a perfect world, vulnerabilities simply would not
exist. In order to solve, once for all, all the security problems it would be suﬃcient to
enforce a few steps, such as:
• strong authentication of both services and users;
• reliable authorization/access control;
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• eﬀective abuse control;
• secure design of protocols, operating systems, and applications;
• bug-free implementation of protocols, operating systems, and applications;
• perfect code policy;
• strong policy enforcement.
Recently the idea of reconsidering the software maintenance policies with security in mind
has been proposed more than once.
For instance, the CERT Secure Coding Initiative [CER06b] works with software developers
and software development organizations to reduce vulnerabilities resulting from coding
errors before they are deployed by providing rules and recommendations for secure coding
practices and libraries designed with security in mind.
Unfortunately, the feeling is that these remarkable initiatives will take some time to catch
up with the real world, where eﬀective security protections are almost always not deployed.
The truth is that administrators do not always keep up with vendor updates/patches,
sites do not monitor or restrict access to their internal hosts, organizations do not devote
enough staﬀ/resources to improve and maintain security (e.g., user education), sites do not
implement policies (if they have one), and infrastructure service providers are driven by
market/service, not security.
Users, on their side, insist on using ﬂawed applications (e.g., mail readers that automatically
execute attachments) and beta services with poor conﬁguration management.
From the above, one can easily deduce that a simple prevention practice cannot be eﬀective
in this context.
Even though the consciousness about security problems seems to be increasing in the last
years, as the CSI/FBI Computer Crime and Security Survey [CSI06] reports 1 a way to
detect and nullify security risks is needed. Here is where intrusion detection comes into
play.
1.1.5 Intrusion Detection
Intrusion detection is the research ﬁeld that study how to detect and possibly nullify
incorrect or anomalous activity that could jeopardize the integrity of a computer system.
Intrusion detection research starts from understanding what are the most common attack
techniques utilized to violate the security of computer systems [MSK01]. The second step is
1This year's questionnaire asked: which techniques does your organization use to assist in the evaluation
of the eﬀectiveness of its information security. 82 percent of respondents report that their organizations use
security audits conducted by their internal staﬀ and the use of the other techniques, such as penetration
testing, automated tools, security audits by external organizations, e-mail monitoring software and Web
activity monitoring software are also widely used for evaluation (58 to 66 percent of the respondents).
From the CSI/FBI Computer Crime and Security Survey 2006 [CSI06]
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No one will do that! We know its the default, but the
administration can turn it oﬀ
Why would anyone do that?
If we don't run as administrator,
We've never been attacked stuﬀ breaks
We're secure: we use But well slip the schedule
cryptography
It's not exploitable
We're secure: we use ACLs
But that's the way we've always
We're secure: we use a ﬁrewall done it
We've reviewed the code, and If we only had better tools...
there are no security bugs
Table 1.2: Ridiculous Excuses We've Heard from Writing Secure Code
to be informed about the current approaches to preventing such attacks [Bis02]. The third
step is to understand and deploy technologies that support the detection of attacks [NN02].
Originally, system administrators performed intrusion detection by sitting in front of a
console and monitoring user activities. They detected intrusions by noticing, for example,
that a vacationing user is logged in locally or that a seldom-used printer is unusually active.
Although eﬀective enough at the time, this early form of intrusion detection was ad hoc
and not scalable [Sto].
The next step in intrusion detection involved audit logs, which system administrators
reviewed for evidence of unusual or malicious behavior. Administrators mainly used audit
logs as a forensic tool to determine the cause of a particular security incident after the fact.
There was little hope of catching an attack in progress.
As storage became cheaper, audit logs moved online and researchers developed programs
to analyze the data. However, analysis was slow and often computationally intensive, and,
therefore, intrusion detection programs were usually run at night when the systems user
load was low. Therefore, most intrusions were still detected after they occurred.
In the early '80s, researchers developed real-time intrusion detection systems that reviewed
audit data as it was produced. This enabled the detection of attacks and attempted at-
tacks as they occurred, which, in turn, allowed for real-time response, and, in some cases,
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 8
attack preemption. More recent intrusion detection eﬀorts have centered on developing
products that users can eﬀectively deploy in large networks. This is no easy task, given
increasing security concerns, countless new attack techniques, and continuous changes in
the surrounding computing environment.
In the future, the importance of intrusion detection will grow. Fast response to attacks is
becoming more and more fundamental since today networks attacks can spread very fast
and easily[SPW02].
For example, at the time of this writing, a zero-day vulnerability has been found in the
handling of animated cursor in various versions of Microsoft Windows (Windows 2000, XP,
2003 and Vista according to CERT). The vulnerability is caused by the lack of a boundary
check in a copy operation in the routines that handle animated cursors and can be exploited
by tricking a user into visiting a malicious website using Microsoft Internet Explorer or
opening a malicious e-mail message. Successful exploitation allows execution of arbitrary
code. This means that virtually everyone who uses Internet Explorer on Windows, that is,
the majority of Web surfers, is at risk.
1.2 Motivation
The present work contributes an analysis of the feasibility and a proof-of-concept imple-
mentation of a parallel, stateful intrusion detection system for high speed networks.
1.2.1 The Need for High-speed Processing
NIDS (Network-based Intrusion Detection Systems) perform security analysis on packets
obtained by eavesdropping on a network link. The constant increase in network speed and
throughput poses new challenges to these systems. Current NIDSs are barely capable of
stateful real-time traﬃc analysis on saturated Fast Ethernet links (100 Mbps). As net-
work technology presses forward, Gigabit Ethernet (1000 Mbps) has become the de-facto
standard for large network installations. In order to protect such installations, a novel ap-
proach for network-based intrusion detection is necessary to manage the ever-increasing
data volume.
Network speeds have increased faster than the speed of processors, and therefore centralized
solutions have reached their limit. This is especially true if one considers in-depth, stateful
intrusion detection analysis. In this case, the sensor has to maintain information about
all attacks in progress (e.g., in the case of multi-step attacks) or they have to perform
application-level analysis of the packet contents. These tasks are resource intensive and in
a single-node setup may seriously interfere with the basic task of retrieving packets from
the wire.
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1.2.2 Parallelizing IDS and Multi-step Attacks
To be able to perform in-depth, stateful analysis it is necessary to divide the traﬃc volume
into smaller portions that can be thoroughly analyzed by intrusion detection sensors. This
approach has often been advocated by the high-performance research community as a way
to distribute the service load across many nodes. In contrast to the case for standard load
balancing, the division (or slicing) of the traﬃc for intrusion detection has to be performed
in a way that guarantees the detection of all the threat scenarios considered.
A number of attacks are multi-step; for instance, to perform a DNS spooﬁng attack it is
necessary for an attacker to intercept a DNS request sent by the victim and send a forged
packet with a malicious name-IP association with the same identiﬁcation number of the
captured one. This packet has to reach the victim before the legitimate response.
In order to detect this attack, a NIDS has to detect:
1. the request,
2. the forged reply,
3. the legitimate reply,
in this order. Therefore, the IDS (Intrusion Detection System) needs to keep some repre-
sentation of the attack state.
If a random division of traﬃc is used in order to distribute the load, sensors may not
receive suﬃcient data to detect an intrusion, because diﬀerent parts of the manifestation
of an attack may have been assigned to diﬀerent slices. Therefore, when an attack scenario
consists of a number of steps, the load balancing mechanism must assure that all of the
packets that could trigger those steps are sent to the sensor conﬁgured to detect that
speciﬁc attack2 [KVVK02].
1.3 Contribution of the Present Work
The present work is aimed at developing and analyzing a novel model for parallel stateful
intrusion detection that is able to scale in order to keep up with the pace of high-speed
network links.
More precisely, in this work we make the following contributions:
• We introduce a novel architecture for the parallel matching of stateful network-based
signatures.
• We present a novel algorithm that allows for the detection of complex, stateful attacks
in a parallel fashion.
2This is a simpliﬁcation carried out for the sake of clarity, a more in-depth analysis will be carried out
in Chapter 4
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• We provide a precise characterization of the bottlenecks that are inherent to the
parallel matching of stateful signatures in the most general case.
• We developed optimizations to reduce the impact of these bottlenecks and improve
the performance of parallel detection.
• We describe a demonstrative, yet working, implementation of the system based on
the Snort intrusion detection engine.
• We provide an evaluation of the implemented system on a real-world testbed.
Chapter 2
Intrusion Detection
Intrusion detection is the process of analyzing a stream of events in order to identify
evidences of attack. Intrusion detection can be applied to diﬀerent domains (e.g., the logs
produced by web server or the network packets transferred on a network segment) and can
be based on diﬀerent techniques.
Before going through an in-depth analysis of intrusion detection and intrusion detection
systems, we give some examples of intrusions and attacks in general.
2.1 Intrusions and Network Attacks
Intrusion is the attempt by an attacker to access or manipulate restricted information and
services or, to prevent legitimate clients to do so (i.e., by compromising a system).
According to the work of Anderson [And80], continued by Axelsson in [Axe00, Axe99],
attacks can be classiﬁed on the basis of two criteria, that is, whether or not the user is
authorized to access the computer system and whether or not she can access a particular
resource on the system. This categorization implies that we can divide intruders in three
classes:
External Penetrators: those who are not authorized to access the system.
Internal Penetrators: those who are authorized to access the system but are not autho-
rized to access the information they have accessed. This class can be further divided
in:
Masqueraders: those who operate under another user's identity
Clandestine Users: whose who evade logs and audits (usually authenticating the
system as an administrator)
Internal penetrators are the culprits of most of the security breaches [CSI06].
Misfeators : those who use their privileges maliciously.
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From the perspective of the goal that the intruder attempts to accomplish, attacks can be
roughly categorized in four categories:
• information gathering;
• unauthorized access;
• disclosure of information;
• denial of service.
From the point of view of the technique utilized in the attack, we can enumerate:
Network Attacks that focus on the networks themselves, rather than simply using them
as a communication channel. The descriptions of some network attacks follows.
Sniﬃng is the technique at the basis of many attacks. The attacker sets her interface
in promiscuous mode and can access all the traﬃc in a network segment.
Since many protocols (TELNET, FTP, HTTP, POP) transfer information in
clear text, it is possible to collect sensible data by sniﬃng the network. There
are plenty of tools, most of them in the public domain, to setup sniﬃng attacks.
Spooﬁng is an attack in which one person or program successfully masquerades as
another by falsifying data and thereby gaining an illegitimate advantage. For
instance in an IP spooﬁng attack, a host impersonates another host by sending
a datagram with the address of some other host as the source address.
IP spooﬁng is used to impersonate sources of security-critical information (e.g.,
a DNS server or a NIS server) and to bypass address-based authentication.
Hijacking is an attack in which an intruder interposes herself in a legitimate con-
versation and steals the role of one of the actors. It can be done at diﬀerent
abstraction levels such as link (ARP), transport (UDP, TCP) and even at the
application level (HTTP and NIS).
Man-in-the-middle is an attach that can be considered a two-sided hijacking, since
the attacker interposes herself in between a conversation between two actors,
leaving the actors unaware of the interception. The perpetrator of a man-in-
the-middle attack usually can access and modify all the information exchanged
by the communication partners.
Fragmentation is an attack whose goal is to cause troubles during the reassembling
stages on the receiving host. Bugs (or features) in fragmentation handling can
be exploited to cause denials of service (e.g., when the size of the reconstructed
packed exceeds the memory available) or to evade ﬁrewalls and intrusion detec-
tion systems (if the packet reconstruction policy diﬀers from the one used by
the end-host, and, therefore malicious packets can be seen as legitimate ones by
the IDS under certain conditions [PN98]).
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Denial of service is a class of attacks in the attacker compromises or even tears
down a service by means of exhausting the resources of the servers she is attack-
ing. There are many known ways to do that: SYN ﬂood, Ping of Death, UDP
storm, etc.
Reconnaissance is an attack that tries to identify and ﬁngerprint the machines
that the attacker wants to compromise and the operating systems running on
them. This is done by means of diﬀerent types of scan such as TCP (connect,
half-open, FIN, ACK, idle scan) and UDP portsweeps. A more precise analysis
of reconnaissance techniques will be provided in Section 3.2.1
Local Attacks are possible when the attacker has already an account on the system she
wants to compromise, i.e., the attacker is an internal penetrator. The vast majority of
the local vulnerabilities in UNIX systems exploit SUID (Set User ID)-root programs
to obtain root privileges. There are many attacks based on this idea: an indicative,
yet non all-encompassing, list follows.
Environment attacks: in those attacks, the attacker gains restricted privileges ma-
liciously modifying environment variables.
Input arguments attacks: these attacks exploit the lack of size-checking and san-
itization in user-provided data to perform overﬂows, command injections, or
directory traversal attacks.
Symlink attacks: these attacks leverage the fact that some applications that create
temporary ﬁles for logging/locking do not test if the ﬁle already exists or whether
is a symbolic link.
Race condition attacks: in this case the attacker races against the applications by
exploiting the gap between testing and accessing a resource. The whole family
of the TOCTTOU (Time-Of-Check-To-Time-Of-Use) attacks is based on this
idea.
File descriptor attacks: these attacks exploit the fact that sometimes SUID ap-
plications open ﬁles to perform their tasks and fork external processes. If the
close-on-exec ﬂag is not set, the new process will inherit the open ﬁle descrip-
tors of the original process. If the spawned program is interruptible, or worse,
is interactive, a malicious user can use the ﬁle descriptors of the father process
and write to them.
Format string attacks: this is a complicate attack based on the simple idea that
the C *printf functions are not type safe, and, if the arguments are interpreted as
a format speciﬁer, it is possible to write arbitrary values in the process memory
by providing a carefully crafted format string.
Overﬂow attacks: these attacks encompass more a common usage pattern than a tech-
nique per se, but we treat them separately since they are one of the most popular
type of attacks. The lack of boundary checking is one of the most common mistakes
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in C/C++ applications. Buﬀer overﬂows can be exploited both locally and remotely
and can modify both the data ﬂow and the control ﬂow of an application. Recent
tools have made the process of exploiting buﬀer overﬂows easier if not completely
automatic. Much research has been devoted to ﬁnding vulnerabilities, design preven-
tion techniques, and developing detection mechanisms. The most common overﬂows
attacks are:
stack-based overﬂows, such as return address overﬂow, jump into libc, oﬀ by one,
longjump overﬂows, and array overﬂows.
heap based overﬂows that exploit in-band control structures for dynamic memory
management and C++ vtables.
integer overﬂows caused by unexpected results when comparing, casting, and adding
integers.
Web Attacks are attacks against web-based authentication, authorization, and HTTP
protocols implementations. Beyond the classical techniques of eavesdropping and
brute-force guessing, examples of web-speciﬁc attack are:
SQL injections, where arbitrary SQL commands are injected into database servers
by exploiting poor sanitization of client-provided data. Similar concepts are used
to inject LDAP [Fau05] and XPath [Kle] based application as well.
session ﬁxation, which forces the user's session ID to a known value. The ID can be
a ﬁxed value or can be obtained by the attacker through a previous interaction
with the vulnerable system [Kol].
cross-site scripting, where the privacy of a client is violated by executing com-
mands on the client impersonating critical servers.
web spooﬁng, also known as a man-in-the-middle attack, which exploits url rewrit-
ing techniques to hijack the user browsing session.
response splitting and request smuggling, which are attacks to HTTP proto-
col implementations.
The aforementioned categorizations are not in contrast with each other and are aimed at
characterizing attacks from diﬀerent points of view. It is remarkable to notice that many
real-world attacks do not ﬁt in any or the categories above but, instead, use a combination
of those attacks.
2.2 A Typical Intrusion Scenario
Intruders usually carry on their attack in more than one step, starting from a process of
information gathering on the target through the very core of the attack.
More precisely, as reported in [Inf06], a typical attack scenario might be made of the
following steps:
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Information gathering. The intruder starts seeking as much information as possible on
her target, operating as stealthy as possible. Some of the most used information
gathering techniques are DNS lookups or e-mail address harvesting. Social engineer-
ing is also widely-used a technique that make use of human weaknesses to gather
information [MS03].
Further information gathering. In an attempt to gather more information an attacker
will usually perform ping sweeps, port scanning, and check web servers for vulnerable
CGI scripts. The intruder will try OS and application ﬁngerprinting to discover which
software versions of applications are running on the target host.
Attack. Having gathered a list of possible loopholes, the intruder will start trying out
diﬀerent attacks against the system. Many tools that try automatically well-known
attacks can help in this step. More sophisticated tool such as nessus [Nes01] can even
automatically gather information on the target, therefore avoiding previous steps, in
order to automatically suggest to the intruder which attacks are likely to succeed.
Presence establishment. After a successful intrusion, an attacker will try to hide her
tracks deleting log ﬁles and setting up a covert channel in order to maintain control
of the attacked machine. An attacked machine is often used as a trampoline to attack
another one. Many attacked and compromised machines can be turned into zombies
and or bots and made part of large-scale bot-nets.
A growing trend among intruders is to randomly scan Internet addresses, looking for a
speciﬁc hole or number of holes. While in the 80s most intruders were skillful experts,
with individually-developed methods for breaking into system, today anyone can scan
Internet sites using readily-available tools and exploit scripts that capitalize on widely-
known vulnerabilities.
Figure 2.1 illustrates the relationship between sophistication of attacks and intruder knowl-
edge from 80s to present.
2.2.1 Countermeasures
Preventing attacks from being successful is the main focus of computer security. As reported
by Mamata D. Desai in [Des02] intrusion detection can be deployed at diﬀerent levels, with
diﬀerent goals:
Prevention blocks attacks from their very initial steps. Prevention techniques include
installing ﬁrewalls, keeping software up-to-date and using ACLs.
Preemption operates against likely threats prior to an intrusion attempt.
Deterrence discourages an intrusion by making her way into the system harder or de-
creasing her perceived gain of a positive attack outcome.
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Figure 2.1: Attack sophistication versus intruder technical knowledge. Source: CERT, see:
[JMA00]
Deﬂection lures the intruder into believing that her attack was successful in order to
study her moves (ﬁshbowling) or to deviate her goals.
Active response counters an intrusion in real time while the attack is being attempted.
Recently systems [Roe] have been proposed that are able to catch attacks in their
early steps and setup rules to neutralize them1. This kind of system are called IPS
(Intrusion Prevention System), because they prevent the attack from being successful
even though they do not prevent the whole attack from start to end.
Detection it the most widely used technique together with prevention. Detection systems
1This is made possible by the fact that packets are diverted from the normal ﬂow through the kernel
stack and processed by the intrusion detection/prevention system before being handed out to applications.
In this fashion, malicious packets can be ﬁltered out and never reach applications.
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monitor activities and raise an alert if some action is categorized as anomalous or ma-
licious. This kind of systems do not counter directly the attack but rely on somebody
who takes care of the alert and operates accordingly.
2.3 Intrusion Detection Systems
IDS (Intrusion Detection System)s are an important instrument for the protection of com-
puter systems and networks. They support mechanisms to perform automatic threat recog-
nition and they can also provide possible defenses.
Figure 2.2: General intrusion detection system structure. Modiﬁed from original version
available here: [ST]
The general architecture of an IDS is outlined in Figure 2.2. Data are collected from the
monitored system and analyzed by the main detection engine. Both the detection engine
and the data collector can use databases and ﬁlesystems to store information temporary
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or permanently.
The detection engine performs the data analysis and its behavior is deﬁned by conﬁguration
rules and possibly also by reference data. Once an alert is raised, depending on the system
setup, diﬀerent actions can take place and can aﬀect virtually all the components of the
system.
Some of the interactions in the ﬁgure are optional (dashed lines), such as the possibility for
both the system itself and the network administrator to modify the monitored system in
response to an alert. If the IDS reacts automatically to an alert by modifying the monitored
system (i.e., trying to prevent the attack to be successful) then the system is known as
an IPS. In usual deployments, the IDS simply alerts the system administrator who will
perform the appropriate defensive actions.
2.3.1 Anomaly detection and Misuse Detection
A common way to characterize IDSs is to examine the models that they use as the basis for
detection. If the models are used to specify what the normal behavior of an application
is, then the system is usually called anomaly-based, because an attack will be detected as
an event (or a series of events) that does not ﬁt the system's idea of what is normal. If
the models are used to specify what is the manifestation of an attack, then the system is
called misuse-based, and the models are often referred to as signatures.
Anomaly Detection Systems
Anomaly-based intrusion detection techniques depict an intrusion as a deviation from nor-
mal behavior. The so called normal behavior needs to be deﬁned, or learned. The ﬁrst
step in deploying anomaly-based detectors is therefore building up a knowledge base about
the monitored domain (e.g, a ﬂow of packets in a network link, a sequence of system calls,
a sequence of HTTP request, etc.) usually derived from long-term system observations and
deﬁne thresholds beyond which the system activity is considered abnormal. These systems
can be learning-based or speciﬁcation-based, depending on the way in which they determine
what is the normal behavior of a system.
Misuse Detection Systems
Misuse detection systems deﬁne what an intrusion is in the observed system and uses a
knowledge-base of system vulnerabilities and patterns of known security violations - so-
called signatures - as a model of the intrusive process. Misuse detection systems identify
evidence of attacks by searching for patterns of known attacks in the data collected from
the monitored system. If an action does not precisely match a signature it is deemed not
malicious and considered acceptable.
Comparison Between Misuse-based and Anomaly-based Intrusion Detection
Both anomaly-based and misuse-based systems have pros and cons.
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Anomaly-based systems are able to detect previously unknown attacks, new exploits and
unforeseen vulnerabilities, but they traditionally produce more false positives, which are
erroneous detections. This is because anomaly detection systems discriminate between
intrusions and legitimate activities based on thresholds (set or learned) that characterize
the normal behavior, which need system-speciﬁc, hard-to-provide, tuning.
Misuse-based systems, on the other hand, are usually faster and have a low false positive
rate, but cannot detect attack for which they do not have a description (such as 0-day
exploits2 ), and, therefore they depend on continuous updating of the signature database.
The advantage of this approach, in addition to the fact that the potential for false alarms
is very low, is the fact that the detailed contextual analysis makes it easy for the security
oﬃcer to take preventive or corrective action, while, instead, is not easy to trace the
identiﬁed anomaly back to the causing attack. This makes it diﬃcult to automatically
initiate countermeasures.
Because of their low false positive rate and their higher performance, and given that they
are simpler to implement and to conﬁgure, misuse-based detection approaches are the basis
for the majority of the existing network-based intrusion detection systems. Unfortunately,
as the the speed of network links increases, keeping up with the pace of events becomes a
real challenge.
In order to overcome the shortcomings of both approaches, as pointed out by Desai in
[Des02], a new breed of systems is being developed that combines the low false-positive
rate of signature-based intrusion detection systems and the ability of anomaly detection
systems to detect novel unknown attacks. These detectors leverage their knowledge of
both intrusive and normal behaviors and use that knowledge to classify events. The results
reported by Hwang et al. in [KHQ] using such kind of systems are very encouraging.
Rule Speciﬁcation
Signature-based intrusion detection systems need some way to describe their models of
attack and which action the system has to accomplish when a signature is matched.
Usually [EVK00, sno04] a rule is described as composed of a predicate, a state, and an
action. The predicate describes the constraints on the values of the event and state at-
tributes. If the predicate evaluates to true for an event then the action is triggered. The
action consists in modifying the rule state or raising an alert (that is, generating a new
event for further processing). The rule maintains state in order to keep track of the relevant
parts of the state of the system. For example, a counter may be used to count the probes
sent that are part of a port scan.
The above considerations give us a general framework in which we can deﬁne attack lan-
guages even though they do not outline any model for the semantics of attack signatures.
A number of languages are proposed in the literature, which diﬀer in the characteristics of
the signatures that can be described.
2 0-day exploits are released before, or on the same day of the release of a vulnerability. The term
derives from the number of days between the public advisory and the release of the exploit. Since 0-day
attacks are generally unknown to the public, it is often diﬃcult to defend against them. See: [Wik07d]
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An important step towards deﬁning a model for semantics of attacks signatures has been
done by Meier in [Mei04] inspired to the one proposed by Zimmer et al. in [ZU99] for
event triggering in active databases. As the author says, the presented model represents
a kind of a checklist for the development of a signature speciﬁcation language or for the
comparison of existing signature speciﬁcation languages.
The model we present in Chapter 4 loosely deﬁnes the semantics of the signatures that our
system will be able to handle. An eﬀort towards a more formal deﬁnition of the semantics
of attack signatures of the parallel model that we present will be taken into consideration
as future work in Chapter 7.
2.3.2 Host Based and Network Based IDS
IDS can be further classiﬁed from the point of view of the domain of operation as HIDS
(Host-based Intrusion Detection System) and NIDS (Network-based Intrusion Detection
Systems)
Host-based Intrusion Detection Systems
Since they are simpler to implement, HIDSs have been the ﬁrst type of intrusion detection
systems developed and deployed in a large scale when networks were not as prevalent as
now. HIDSs analyzed audit logs looking for suspicious activities and are mostly used in
the aftermath of attacks to understand weaknesses of the system and to prevent future
attacks.
Today, HIDSs are more responsive to attacks even though they are still based on the same
concepts as before. Typically, HIDSs monitor system, events and security logs on Windows
and UNIX environments. When a log ﬁle changes the IDS compares the new log entry
with known signatures, and, if an attack is detected, the system raises and alarm or puts
in action defensive responses.
HIDSs include other mechanisms to monitor the system status such as checking key ﬁles
and executable via checksums at regular interval or listening to known port activities.
According to Desai, Host-Based IDSs are characterized by the following advantages:
• verify success or failure of an attack;
• monitor speciﬁc system activities;
• detect alerts that network-based systems miss;
• are well-suited for encrypted and switched environments;
• perform near-real-time detection and response;
• require no additional hardware;
• have a lower cost per entry.
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Host based systems also have disadvantages; for example, they aﬀect the performance of
the host being monitored.
Network-based Intrusion Detection Systems
NIDSs monitor traﬃc on the network. They capture all the packets crossing the networks
by placing they interface in promiscuous mode then pass those packet to a detector that
performs signature matching on them. Signatures usually describe combinations of con-
dition on packet headers and payload such as the presence of the word cgi-bin in the
payload or the evidence that packets are directed to port 80.
The strengths of NIDSs are:
• lowers cost of ownership;
• detection of attacks that host-based systems miss;
• are more resistant to tampering with evidence.
• perform real-time detection and response;
• detect of unsuccessful attacks and malicious intent;
• do not impact the monitored hosts.
However, network-based IDS, are vulnerable to evasion attacks [PN98], where an attacker
desynchronizes the views of the IDS and the monitored system.
Comparison Between Host-based and Network-based Intrusion Detection
Both HIDSs an NIDSs have advantages and disadvantages. Host-based audit records are
qualitatively better suited for intrusion recognition. On the other hand, NIDSs can be less
costly if installed at a central place of the protected net without inﬂuencing the eﬃciency
of the end systems.
More precisely, host-based solutions require the conﬁguration of each individual host in the
protected environment and they can be used on a single operating system at one time. On
the other hand, being based on the analysis of standard network protocols common to all
operating systems, NIDSs can monitor a heterogeneous set of hosts in the same time.
Another problem with HIDSs is that the eﬃciency of the hosts is impaired by the event
logging and its analysis and event logging itself can be delayed by the OS, slowing down
the responsiveness of the IDS. NIDSs are not concerned with this problems, since they
monitor passively broadcast networks, they do not impair performance of hosts, and can
respond to events almost instantaneously.
A major problem from the security point of view of HIDSs is that since the IDS lives on the
host, if the host is compromised the audit trials can be compromised by an attacker that
breaks into it. Theoretically speaking when an attack is successful the IDS has failed its
purpose and becomes useless, but, practically, having the possibility to check for evidence
CHAPTER 2. INTRUSION DETECTION 22
of attacks in a post-mortem setup is still useful. Since NIDSs are invisible to the intruder,
they cannot be turned oﬀ, and the data they collect cannot be compromised.
As a ﬁnal remark, many of the more seriously documented cases of computer intrusions
have utilized a network at some point and the network itself, having become a critical
point of the environment, can be the target of attacks that NIDSs can monitor while
HIDSs cannot.
To sum it up, due to the comparatively good recognition accuracy, NIDSs are the most
popular and commonly used approach at present because of all the aforementioned reasons
and moreover because they are easy to install and conﬁgure.
Both HIDSs an NIDSs are facing the increasing performance of both networks and end
systems. As pointed out by Meier et al. [MMK05], this leads to an increasing audit data
volume that has to be analyzed. In addition, new attacks and vulnerabilities imply that
the number of signatures to be analyzed increases as well, and, therefore, the eﬃciency of
IDSs becomes critical. Today, systems under heavy load discard some of the log data that
should be processed. This leads to inaccuracies in detection and makes it impossible to
perform eﬀective counter measures.
2.3.3 IDS Evaluation
The principal criteria utilized to evaluate the performances of an IDS are:
responsiveness, which discriminates between real-time and oine systems. Real-time
systems can respond to the evidence of attacks as soon as they acquire and analyze
the information from the monitored system. Therefore they can react and have the
possibility to foil still ongoing attacks. Oine systems, instead, analyze batches of
audit logs and can discover attacks only already occurred.
response time, which describes ho an IDS reacts to an event. IDSs can behave actively or
passively with respect to attack evidence. Active responses encompass the possibility
for the IDS to operate on the monitored system in order to neutralize the root
cause of the detected attacks, while a passive IDS will simply report to the system
administrator that an anomalous event has occurred.
interoperability, which describes the ability of an IDS to interact with other IDS or
network devices in order to exchange data (for instance, an IDS could be able to talk
to the ﬁrewall of the network and delete routes to prevent ongoing intrusions).
coverage, which characterizes the attacks that an IDS can detect under ideal conditions.
For instance for a signature-based IDS the coverage is simply the number of signa-
tures.
accuracy, which is one of the most important feature of an IDS. Accuracy measures the
ability of the system to successfully detect attacks, that is the TPR versus the rate
of false alarm, or FPR. An ideal IDS should detect all the attacks (100% TPR (True
Positive Rate)) and never raise a false alarm (0% FPR (False Positive Rate)).
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This concept can be clariﬁed and visualized using a ROC (Receiver Operating Char-
acteristic) curve3. A ROC curve can be used to compare performance of diﬀerent
IDS as their operating point (i.e. how their rules are tuned) is varied. An ideal IDS
would have a ROC curve wrapping around the upper left corner of the space, while
the baseline to compare with for ROC analysis is a random classiﬁer (i.e. the poorest
possible accuracy), that is represented by the bisector of the ROC space.
A more in-depth overview on intrusion detection evaluation can be found in the NIST
Interagency Report n. 7007 [oSTIPM03].
2.4 Parallel Intrusion detection
As discussed in Chapter 1 as networks become faster and the number of signatures4 in-
creases, the processing time associated with intrusion detection become signiﬁcant.
Therefore there is an emerging need for security analysis techniques that can keep up with
nowadays' analysis demand. Many attempts to ameliorate the problem, under diﬀerent
perspectives, have been done and the most promising solution from the eﬃciency and
scalability points of view has been found in parallelization [WF07].
Parallelization can occur at diﬀerent levels of the intrusion detection system. In Chap-
ter 3 we will take into consideration the current work on this particularly new research
ﬁeld. We will take into consideration present solutions to augment intrusion detection with
parallelization.
We make a clear distinction between parallel IDSs and distributed IDSs. A distributed IDS
utilizes distributed monitoring at various locations in a network and its goal is to improve
the quality of detection by gathering more data. Our work will not focus on distributed
systems but will try to propose a model and a parallel algorithm to improve the eﬃciency
of intrusion detection on high-speed networks.
3A ROC curve [Wik07b], is a graphical plot of the TPR versus the FPR for a binary classiﬁer system
as its discrimination threshold is varied.
4To give an example, in 2003 the Snort default ruleset was composed of 1500 signatures while as today
(April 2007) there are about 8500 rules in the default ruleset.
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Present Work
3.1 Improving IDS Performance
The problem of keeping up with the fast pace of events in high speed networks has been
addressed from diﬀerent perspectives by current research in intrusion detection.
The commercial world attempted to respond to this need and a number of vendors now
claim to have sensors that can operate on high-speed ATM or Gigabit Ethernet links. For
example, ISS [ISS01] oﬀers NetICE Gigabit Sentry, a system that is designed to monitor
traﬃc on high-speed links. The company advertises the system as being capable of perform-
ing protocol reassembly and analysis for several application-level protocols (e.g., HTTP,
SMTP, POP) to identify malicious activities.
Other IDS vendors (like Cisco [CIS01]) oﬀer comparable products with similar features.
TopLayer Networks [Top01] presents a switch that keeps track of application-level sessions.
The network traﬃc is split with regard to these sessions and forwarded to several intrusion
detection sensors. Packets that belong to the same session are sent through the same
link. This allows sensors to detect multiple steps of an attack within a single session.
Unfortunately, the correlation of information between diﬀerent sessions is not supported.
This could result in missed attacks when attacks are performed against multiple hosts (e.g.,
ping sweeps), or across multiple sessions (e.g. FTP session uses two distinct connections).
Very few research papers have been published that deal with the problem of stateful in-
trusion detection on high-speed links.
We can group the research focuses on the topic in two distinct approaches:
• enhance the throughput by ameliorating the bottlenecks of current systems, or
• deploy new systems that exploit parallelization to improve speedup.
In the following sections, we will take a look at both the approaches.
Optimizations on the Single Sensor Model
The tentative of improving current solutions has been proposed by many and leverages
both hardware-based and algorithmic-based solutions. Hardware-based are most common
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solutions used to achieve high performance.
NIDSs are currently directed towards custom network solutions involving FPGAs, ASICs
and the so called Network processors1.
As pointed out by Colajanni et al. in their work [CM06], custom hardware cannot be
considered a long term solution because only pushes further the maximum manageable
throughput without giving a scalable solution. Moreover, custom hardware solutions are
not ﬂexible and cannot be easily extended by the end user.
In particular, many ad hoc hardware systems operate on single packets mostly performing
pattern matching and do not provide support for complex stateful signatures, where the
evidence necessary to detect an attack is spread across multiple packets at diﬀerent points
in time.
A great deal of research has been devoted to trying to increase the eﬃciency of pattern
matching on packets. In this realm we can ﬁnd the work of Lu et al. [LZL+06] in which a
system to processes multiple characters per clock cycle using multiple parallel deterministic
ﬁnite automata is proposed.
Their system is implemented in hardware by means of a BCAM (binary content addressable
memory) and an embedded SRAM. The authors start from the evidence, conﬁrmed by
other [FV01, WF07], that the content matching phase dominates the overall runtime in
today's NIDSs (e.g., this phase accounts up to the 75% in Snort 2.6.0). By employing
an eﬃcient representation of the transition rules in each DFA, their system signiﬁcantly
reduces the complexity using dedicated hardware and can handle the throughput of an
OC-768 link (40Gb/s).
Although this approach seems very promising and the authors foresee that it could keep
up with 100Gb/s data throughput, its major downside is that the matching is performed
on a per-packet basis and it is not possible to extend the system to make it capable of
dealing with complex stateful attacks (e.g., co-ordinated port scans, see Section 3.2.1).
Other solutions to improve the pattern matching capabilities of IDSs are software-based.
Sekar et al. [SGVS99] describe an approach to perform high-performance analysis of net-
work data. They propose a domain-speciﬁc language for capturing patterns of normal
and or abnormal packet sequences (therefore, their system encompasses both misuse and
anomaly detection). Moreover, they developed an eﬃcient implementation of data aggre-
gation and pattern matching operations. A key feature of their implementation is that the
pattern-matching time is insensitive to the number of rules, thus making the approach
scalable to large number of rules.
The shortcomings in the work of Sekar et al. is that the processing of the packets is done
on a central sensor that therefore needs to be able to keep up with the fast pace of packets
on high-speed networks. An estimate of the maximum throughput that today's computers
are able to handle is given by Luca Deri in [Der05]. He shows that by means of a memory
1Network processors are integrated circuits speciﬁcally designed for the networking application domain,
i.e., to elaborate packet in packet-switched networks. Network processors usually have optimized func-
tions such as pattern matching, key lookup (used for routing and switching lookup address), data bitﬁeld
manipulation, queue management and control processing [Wik07a].
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eﬃciency/low latency technique2 it is possible to achieve a Gigabit/s Ethernet speed (1.48
Mpps) in packet capturing. Techniques like the one described by Deri can be used in
intrusion detection sensors to enhance the performance of a single matcher, but for OC-48
through OC-768 (40Gbps) links a single matcher is not enough.
Building up from the foundations laid by Sekar, but using a more general and implementation-
independent -yet proﬁtable, in real world experiments- approach, Meier et al. [MMK05]
propose a method for system optimization in order to detect complex attacks.
They propose a method to reduce the analysis run time. This method focuses on complex,
stateful, signatures. Therefore, it is a step forward with respect to the pattern matching
optimization proposed by [LZL+06]. Starting from Petri-net-based modeling of attack sig-
natures, they observed several structural properties of signatures that can be exploited to
speed-up the detection process. This includes the avoidance of redundant evaluations of
conditions by identifying common expressions as well as the separation between intra- and
inter-event conditions. Furthermore, they claim that matching signature instances can be
eﬃciently based on comparison operations of inter-event conditions by indexing existing
signature instances using the values of their features and that the analysis eﬃciency can be
improved by controlling the evaluation order of conditions. Moreover they developed and
tested a prototype implementation of their system on a handcrafted worst-case scenario of
trials data and discovered that it performs very well, compared to other system, such as
STAT [EVK00] in terms both of runtime and memory usage.
The Parallel Approach
We now review some approaches that aim at parallelizing the existing architectures with
particular emphasis on stateful processing.
Sommers et al. [SP05] propose a way to exchange state among sensors by serializing it
into a ﬁle and exchanging the serialized version. Their approach is focused on providing
a framework to transfer ﬁne-grained state among diﬀerent sensors in order to enhance
the IDS with many features. As the authors state these include coordinating distributed
monitoring; increasing NIDS performance by splitting the analysis load across multiple
CPUs in a variety of ways; selectively preserving key state across restarts and crashes;
dynamically reconﬁguring the operation of the NIDS on-the-ﬂy; tracking the usage over
time of the elements of a NIDS scripts to support high-level policy maintenance; and
enabling detailed proﬁling and debugging.
Although the authors provide a way to exchange ﬁne-grained state among sensors, no
emphasis on high performance emerges from the paper. The method is not immediately
responsive to attacks and cannot keep on with fast pacing traﬃc.
A number of approaches have been proposed to address the problem of matching stateful
signatures on high-speed networks in a parallel fashion. In [KVVK02] a distributed ar-
2The system he proposes, called ncap is based on a commercial network adapter and dispatches packets
directly from the NIC driver to userland bypassing kernel. The system can achieve wire-speed captures
throughput leveraging a 64-bit PCI-X bus with memory-based interrupt, interrupt mitigation and priori-
tization, and enhanced performance and bandwidth.
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chitecture was proposed to partition the traﬃc into slices of manageable size, which were
then examined by a dedicated intrusion detection sensor. This slicing technique took into
account the signatures used by the intrusion detection sensors, so that all the evidences
needed to detect an attack were guaranteed to appear in the slice associated with the sen-
sor responsible for the detection of that particular attack. Therefore, no communication
among the intrusion detection sensors was necessary.
More precisely the overall architecture of the proposed system is sketched in Figure 3.1
Figure 3.1: High-level architecture of the high-speed intrusion detection system. Source:
[KVVK02]
The system consists of a network tap, a traﬃc scatterer, a set of m traﬃc slicer, a set of n
traﬃc reassemblers, and a set of p intrusion detection sensors. The network tap monitors
the traﬃc stream on a high-speed link and extracts sequences of link frames that are passed
to the scatterer which, in turn, partitions the traﬃc into m subsequences in a round-robin
fashion. Each slice is then processed by a slicer. The task of the slicers is to route the
frames they receive to the sensors that may need them to detect an attack. This task is not
performed directly by the scatterer because the frame routing may be complex and time
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consuming, and, therefore, the scatterer could be overwhelmed by the high throughput.
The traﬃc slicers are connected to a switch component, which allows a slicer to send a
frame to one or more outgoing channels. All the sensors associated with a channel are
able to access all the packets sent to that channel. The traﬃc reassemblers' task is to
make sure that the packets appear on the channel on the same order they appeared on
the high-speed link, since packets could have arrived to the channel taking diﬀerent paths,
over diﬀerent slicers. Each sensor is associated with diﬀerent attack scenarios (i.e., tries to
match diﬀerent attack signatures), which, in turn, are associated to diﬀerent event spaces.
The slicers have to ensure that all the packets relative to the event space matched by a
sensor are forwarded to it.
(a) Parallel detection rate for increasing traﬃc lev-
els
(b) Parallel detection rate for increasing number of
signatures
The experiments proposed by Kruegel et al. shows how their parallel matching system
outperforms a single IDS instance that easily gets overrun by the high throughput (Figure
3.1)
Unfortunately, even though the system was able to improve the overall performance of the
detection process, it was not able to eﬀectively partition the traﬃc in the case of complex
stateful signatures. This is because, in general, the correct partitioning of the traﬃc is only
known at runtime and therefore any approach that uses a static partitioning algorithm
needs to over-approximate the event space associated with a signature.
In this work, we propose a novel technique to address this issue. Our technique is similar
to the one proposed in [KVVK02] in that it uses a partitioning technique to reduce the
traﬃc on a high-speed link to slices of manageable size, and, in addition, it uses a number
of parallel sensors. However, in our approach the sensors are able to communicate through
a high-speed, low latency dedicated control plane. By doing this, they can provide feedback
to each other and synchronize their detection processes. As a result, it is possible to match
complex, stateful signatures without having to over-approximate the event space.
Colajanni et al. in their work [CM06] enhance the previous architecture by providing
dynamic load balancing mechanism for the traﬃc-distribution algorithm. A monitoring
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system is added to the previously described architecture in order to trigger load balancing
actions when some of the sensors risk to lose packets because overwhelmed by the traﬃc. In
this situation the monitoring system triggers the migration of state associated with tracked
connections from a sensor to another one, and, at the same time, instructs the traﬃc slicer
to divert the traﬃc relative to those connections from the overloaded sensor to the target
of the migration. In some sense this architecture mix the technique described by Sommers
et al. in [SP05] with the architecture proposed by Kruegel et al. in [KVVK02].
Later, Wheeler et al. [WF07] proposed a taxonomy of IDSs that encompasses the previous
techniques. More precisely the previous techniques are classiﬁed as node level paralleliza-
tion since the sensor nodes are used as atomic entities. The architecture proposed by
Kruegel et al. [KVVK02] is an example of data and function parallelization since diﬀer-
ent sensors have diﬀerent rules loaded (i.e., perform diﬀerent functions) and are fed with
diﬀerent traﬃc slices (diﬀerent data). Wheeler et al. take into consideration other kinds
of parallelization that they call component and sub-component level parallelization.
In component parallelism, individual components of the IDS are isolated and given their
own processing element. For instance, pre-processing and content matching can be put in
separate processes (paying attention in ensuring data consistency in diﬀerent steps). Sub-
component parallelism refers to the parallelization of individual components of the IDS;
for instance, the parallelization of the content matching proposed by Lu et al. [LZL+06] is
an example of sub-component parallelization.
To complete the overview of present work on high-speed intrusion detection, we review
some optimizations that improve the parallel IDS.
Xinidis et al. have proposed ad hoc techniques to improve the packet splitter that distribute
the incoming traﬃc to sensors [XCA+06]. They argue that the splitter should be actively
involved in analyzing the traﬃc and propose some enhancements. The authors propose to
enhance the splitter with packet header inspection (since it is has a small CPU/memory
footprint) in order to ﬁlter out early from the detection chain packets that surely cannot
match any rule, such as, packets with no payload and with a header that does not match
any header-based rule. Remaining packets are sent to sensors in order to be checked against
the full set of rules (both header- and payload-based). Another technique employed by the
authors is to smartly queue packets on the splitter in order to serve them to sensor in
bursts of homogeneous sets. Sensors will gain from the similarity of packet features (i.e.,
header ﬁelds) because this will improve the locality of their memory accesses and therefore
will reduce cache misses. Test showed that early ﬁltering improves slightly the performance
by lowering the load on the sensors (32% less packets to analyze, 8% increase in perfor-
mance) and the locality buﬀer improved by 10% the overall performance (in particular, the
throughput on the slowest link was improved by 14%).
3.2 Applications
We have taken into consideration a great deal of architectures and approaches to improve
the eﬃciency of misuse detection system on high-speed networks but we still have given
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little or no examples of what we want this system to be able to perform.
We can think the problem of stateful intrusion detection at diﬀerent levels. A very simple
form of state to be maintained for an IDS is the state associated with TCP/IP ﬂows. As
seen in the previous section, many systems are now stateful ﬂow-wise, that is, the are able
to detect attacks based on a particular sequence of packets of the same TCP connection.
Thanks to the fact that is easy to partition a stream of packets in diﬀerent ﬂows (computing
a hash on some header ﬁelds), a centralized system can be transformed into a parallel one
made of sensors that process manageable slices of traﬃc with little or no eﬀort.
Such systems work well in practice when they have only signatures whose scope is limited to
single ﬂows. But there are attacks that can be carried on exploiting multiple connections (we
have seen the case of attacks against FTP, which employs two connections), but the event
space of a signature can be approximated easily, making possible, again, parallelization by
traﬃc slicing. Parallelization by traﬃc slicing works every time that an instance of every
attack that needs to be detected has an event space that cannot span more than one slice.
There are cases when the event space of a signature can be as big as the whole event space
processed, or, in other words, one cannot easily avoid that diﬀerent parts of the manifes-
tation of an attack may be assigned to diﬀerent slices. An example of such problematic
attacks is the co-ordinated port scan.
3.2.1 Port Scan
As seen in Chapter 1, before an adversary tries to mount an attack against a target, she will
usually try to perform some kind of information gathering in order to discover potential
vulnerabilities [LFG+00]. As stated by the HoneyNet Project [Pro02],Most attacks involve
some type of information gathering before the attack is launched.
One of the most used techniques for information gathering is the port scan. A port scan is
a technique employed to determine if a particular service is available on a predetermined
host by observing the responses to carefully-crafted packets.
Panjwani et al. [pan05] have found that approximately 50% of attacks are preceded by some
form of scanning activity. Catching a reconnaissance activity in its early steps therefore
increases the possibility of preventing an attack from being accomplished.
Types of Port Scan
Port scans can be classiﬁed on the basis of the technique used by the attacker. We brieﬂy
review the various techniques drawing on the scanning capabilities of nmap [Fyo07], the
state-of-the-art tool for network reconnaissance.
connect() scan is the most basic form of scan. The attacker initiated a full TCP connec-
tion (accomplishing the three-way handshake) to see if a particular port is accepting
TCP connections.
SYN scan, also known as half open scanning, is performed by sending a TCP packet
with SYN ﬂag set to test if a port is open. A received SYN/ACK packet informs the
CHAPTER 3. PRESENT WORK 31
attacker that the scanned port is open, while a RST packet received means that the
port is not listening.
ACK, FIN, Xmas, Null scans use a packet crafted with a combination of set ﬂags to
probe a port. Depending on the response of the target host the attacker will be
informed if the scanned ports are closed or ﬁltered. Most ﬁrewalls do not log this
kind of attacks.
UDP scan uses UDP packet that are sent to the target host. A received ICMP port
unreachable informs that the port is closed. UDP-based scanning is slow and easily
recognized and logged by IDSs.
Idle scan [Ant98] where an attacker scans the target harnessing an idle zombie host. This
is the ultimate stealth scanning technique since the target host will not receive any
packet from the attacker. Instead, the attack is performed on behalf of the attacker
by the zombie host.
Decoy scan is a technique of camouﬂage. Every kind of the aforementioned scan tech-
niques can be used mixing real scan packets with packets with spoofed address in
order to confuse IDSs.
In addition to this type of port scans, nmap also oﬀers a number of advanced features such
as remote OS detection via TCP/IP ﬁngerprinting, dynamic delay and retransmission
calculations, parallel scanning, detection of down hosts via parallel pings, port ﬁltering
detection, direct (non-portmapper) RPC scanning, fragmentation scanning, and ﬂexible
target and port speciﬁcation.
The aforementioned techniques can be used in diﬀerent attacks setups. More precisely,
from the point of view of number of attackers and targets scans can be divided in:
One-to-one scan where a single source performs a scan to a single target machine.
One-to-many scan where a single source scans more than one target machine. If the
attacker performs scanning activity to a single port on multiple hosts it is commonly
referred as portsweep.
Many-to-one scan where more than one source machine scan a single target machine.
Many-to-many scan where a group of source machines (more than one) perform scans
on a group of target machines (more than one).
Detection Techniques
When an attacker scans a single host, a host-based IDS can easily detect the scan. Moreover,
if the scan is performed over a short period of time detection is even easier.
Traditionally, port scan detection is performed using a simple algorithm that checks whether
a given IP source address touched more than a predetermined number of diﬀerent ports
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on the same host or diﬀerent IP addresses within a given time window. This kind of ap-
proaches, as reported by Jung et al. in [JPBB04] have diﬃculties catching all but high-rate
scanners and often suﬀer from signiﬁcant levels of false positives.
Jung et al. [JPBB04] presented an algorithm based on sequential hypothesis testing called
Threshold Random Walk that can perform a prompt detection of scans even when they
occur at a very slow rate. Authors claim that Threshold Random Walk can generally detect
a scanner after 4 or 5 connection attempts, with high accuracy.
Problems arise when scans are performed scanning few ports on diﬀerent machines and
possibly from diﬀerent sources.
In this case, the adversary will divide the target space amongst multiple source IP ad-
dresses, so that each source scans a portion of the target. The result is that an intrusion
detection system might not detect any of the sources. If the sources are detected, the system
will not recognize that the various sources are collaborating.
This kind of co-ordinated reconnaissance is primarily of interest to a particular niche of
defenders, such as those at the nation-state level.
In order to detect co-ordinated port scans some techniques rely on correlating a huge
amount of information (usually a list of single source port scan). For instance, Gates [Gat06]
proposes a method to ﬁnd co-ordinated port scan evidence by employing an algorithm that
is inspired by heuristics for the set covering problem.
Sridharan et al. propose [SYB06] a method to detect (single sourced) port scan on backbone
links. They stress the fact that there are several important diﬀerences between detection
port scans in a transit network and in an enterprise-level stub network. One of the most
important is of course that link speeds at the core of a transit network are much higher
(e.g., 10 Gbps) than at the edge, where it connects to a stub network.
Therefore, the link throughput and the memory needed to store the partial state infor-
mation makes centralized solutions unfeasible. Moreover, on a backbone link the space of
source and target address is virtually inﬁnite, and thus it is impossible to partition the
traﬃc on a per-connection basis, which excludes all the parallelized solutions seen so far.
In conclusion, present solutions to enhance IDS performance cannot deal with all the
kinds of attacks. Co-ordinated port scans and all the attacks whose signatures spread all
the event space cannot be parallelized by data parallelization, which is the only way to
relief the sensor from livelock, and continue performing stateful intrusion. In the following





Following the considerations drawn in Chapter 3, we brieﬂy specify our intrusion detection
model, which will be then used as the basis to describe diﬀerent aspects of the intrusion
detection process.
In general, as seen in Chapter 2, a misuse detection system scans a stream of events and
detects attacks using attack signatures, which are models of the manifestation of an attack.
The signatures, or rules, are matched against the stream of events by a rule matching
system.
In this case, we deﬁne an event e as a set of attribute-value pairs (ai, vi).
The input to the rule matching system consists of a stream (ordered set) of events, which
we represent as E .
In the case of a network-based IDS, an event is an abstraction of what happens of relevant
on the network with respect to our detection purpose. From this perspective, every packet
coming from the tap is to be considered an event.
In general, every stream of information can be considered as a stream of events. Even
though in this work we focus on packet analysis, most of the concepts discussed here can
be reused in diﬀerent contexts, such as system call analysis [MVKV06]. Even the alerts
generated by the intrusion detection system itself can be seen as an event stream that can
be re-processed in a hierarchical fashion [SHM02].
Event streams are checked against signatures, which represents a subsequence of the stream
of particular interests. In order to detect an attack signature, rules are applied to the stream
of events.
As seen in Section 2.3.1, a rule r is described as composed of a predicate P , a state S, and
an action A [EVK00, sno04]. The predicate P describes the constraints on the values of the
event and state attributes. If the predicate evaluates to true for an event then the action is
triggered. The action A consists in modifying the rule state (in this case the rule is deemed
stateful) or raising an alert (that is, generating a new event for further processing). The
rule maintains state S in order to keep track of the relevant part of the state of the system.
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For example, a counter may be used to detect a port scan.
A number of architectures that implement a rule matching system as described above
can be found in both the literature and the real world [Roe99, Pax98, EVK00]. These
architectures are centralized, which means that a single processing node deals with all the
events. The eﬃcient design of a parallel system that implements the rule matching process
is challenging.
Without loss of generality, herein, after we focus on network traﬃc analysis. The ﬁrst thing
to focus on is to understand what we want to gain from a parallel architecture that analyzes
network traﬃc versus its non-parallel version.
The NIDS pattern matching activities carried on the packets require both memory (space)
and processing power. Nevertheless, the ﬁrst bottleneck encountered in present implemen-
tations is of course the processing power, since, as we have seen in Chapter 3, both network
drivers and kernels easily fall under the weight of a fast paced packet stream. The memory
usage should not be neglected, thought. In some cases, attacks could span a long period
of time and therefore need a great amount of memory to store ﬁne-grained information to
perform intrusion detection. 1
A parallel architecture should thus help lower the processing power demand. The only
way to achieve parallelization in pattern matching activities on packets is to distribute
the network traﬃc among diﬀerent agents. In order to do that, we reﬁne the standard
rule/events model proposed above with some assumptions:
1. Each sensor tries to match one or more rules against the traﬃc it is fed with. Rule
scanning is performed such that multiple matches are all considered. This means that
if a packet triggers a rule, and even if a terminal one, resulting in an alert, the sensor
is not dispensed from matching all the remaining rules.
2. The system does not rely on any predeﬁned mapping between packets and sensors.
There is not any locality concept in signatures, every packet could be sent to any of
the sensors. This is a more general approach than the one described in [KVVK02]
where the traﬃc slicer implemented and enforced a mapping between packet features
and sensors based on the analysis of signatures' event spaces. Here, we take into
consideration the most general case, that is, for any pair of packets, we do not have
any a priori knowledge that they both belong to the same event space. Stricter
assumptions in order to optimize the proposed model will be analyzed later.
From the assumptions above immediately follows that every packet coming from the net
has to be scanned against all the rules at least once. This goal can be accomplished in
diﬀerent ways:
1As seen in Chapter 3, for instance in order to detect distributed (co-ordinated) port scans some
technique [Gat06, SHM02] rely on correlating a huge amount of information (usually a list of single source
port scan). If the traﬃc to be checked against a port scan was a backbone link, where the space of sensors
and scanned address is virtually inﬁnite, the memory needed to store the partial state information would
probably overwhelm every other resource in a real world sensor implementation.
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1. The sensors have diﬀerent state (diﬀerent rules or diﬀerent state in the same rule),
and every packet must meet with each of them; or
2. The sensors have the same state (i.e., they evolve in a synchronized fashion and all
the sensor state is replicated) and a packet could hit just one, or
3. A mix of the above (sensors have overlapping states and packets have to hit some of
them in order to cover all the rules states)
These solutions cover the spectrum of all the possible ones, ranging from the heavy dupli-
cation in the sensors state (memory) and no duplication in traﬃc (packets) of solution 1 to
the heavy duplication in traﬃc and no duplication in memory of solution 2. Since we are
seeking to reduce computation time in scanning packets because this is recognized to be a
real bottleneck for a single machine, we want to move towards the solution that guarantees
the minimum amount of traﬃc to be scanned, that is, solution 2.
In this setup the rule state is maintained in the same way on all the sensors, which means
that:
Fact 1 Each packet encounters the same working state no matter which sensor is going to
take charge of it
In particular, this means that there need to be some kind of (hopefully simple) action that
has to be performed in the same manner on all the packets, that is, the evaluation
of the predicate for each rule. In other words, this means that t
Fact 2 he scanning part, up to and included the predicate evaluations mechanism, has to
be present on every sensors in the same form.
This is no a problem itself, since predicates can be preloaded in the sensors and will thus
behave separately leading to a total parallel sensor speedup.
Unfortunately, as we have seen in Chapter 3, problems arise when the predicate evaluation
is a function of the rule state itself and possibly modiﬁes the state (this happens with rules
that match signatures of stateful attacks, that is, attacks caused by an ordered sequence
of events), more precisely, a matching at time t1 determines the behavior of subsequent
scanning at time t > t1, more precisely, the predicate of the rule is in the form:
Deﬁnition 1
SRi,t+1 = F (It, SRj,∀j∈R,t)
where It is the input at time t, Ri is a generic rule, SRi,t is the state of the rule i at time t
and R is the general rule set loaded into a sensor (For the sake of simplicity we can simply
restrict ourselves to the case in which the state of a rule i can be modiﬁed only by the rule
itself so Deﬁnition 1 above would become SRi,t+1 = F (It, SRi,t).
If one sees the rule matching process as a state machine, F is no more than its transition
function.
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The computationally expensive parts of the whole process are hidden in the formalism
above and are most notably the evaluation of the I feature, performed in the predicate
evaluations, which will eventually trigger a transition and the corresponding state update.
Evaluating the predicate is part of the scanning process and it is perfectly parallelizable,
since each sensor evaluates the same predicate on diﬀerent packets and we cannot exempt
from doing that for each packet if we do not have any a priori knowledge on the mapping
between packets and sensors. However, the state update is instead really what we do not
want in a parallel system, because it is an operation that needs to be repeated for all
the sensors in the same manner since all the packets have to encounter the same state
regardless the sensor by which they are being processed.
These considerations are not very encouraging when building a parallel system as described
before. Amdahl's law [Amd67] here ﬁts perfectly: the time needed by the state update has to
be spent by all the sensors for each packet that modiﬁes the state even though this happens
on only one sensor, and, therefore, cannot be parallelized (see Section 4.4). During the state
update, all the sensors do the same operation behaving as they where a single machine and
without exploiting any parallelization.
Note that the above considerations hold for the scanned packets that match and thus
update the rule state. Not all the packets will match (hopefully very few will) so we can
still gain a lot by parallelizing the packet scanning process.
We will formalize the above considerations in Section 4.4, but we already understand that
the bottleneck of the architecture deemed to address a general parallel stateful signature
matching is updating the state of the rule when a match occurs.
Intuitively, we need to force the state update operation to be as fast as possible because it
does not scale 2. In order to do that, we need to rethink what the state of a rule is. Not
all the state of a rule is needed for the predicate evaluation, and, therefore, we can redeﬁne
the concept of rule, trying to separate the state really needed for the scanning part from
the one which is needed for other subsequent operations.
More precisely, we split the rule state into two parts: a scanning state, or predicate state,
and a working state. The working state is needed to raise the alert but it does not modify
the scanning state and thus the matching capability. Only the predicate state needed for
the evaluation has to be updated in the aforementioned non-scalable way, while the actual
working state can live on a separate centralized machine, that we call control node and
be updated asynchronously. Later we will focus on the architecture of the system).
More formally, we can functionally decompose a rule as below:
Deﬁnition 2
SPi,t+1 = FSP (It, SPi,t)
OPi,t+1 = FOP (It, SPi,t)
2Later on, we will be show other pitfalls in the scaling analysis.
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Deﬁnition 3
SWi,t+1 = FSW (OPi,t, SWi,t)
OWi,t+1 = FOW (SWi,t)
(SPi) is the scanning (or predicate) state and (SWi) is the working state.
Deﬁnition 2 describes the behavior of the generic sensor i in term of a Mealy Machine while
Deﬁnition 3 describes the control action in terms of a Moore Machine. The fundamental
point is that the control node can process the output from the sensors in a completely
decoupled environment from where the sensors live.
The deﬁnitions above postulate that there is no feedback from the working state to the
sensor state. This means that the two automata are working in cascade. So far, this is
not a limitation since we still haven't deﬁned in which way the rule state management has
to be split. This is a very important part of the model, and it is up to who writes the
rules. Intuitively, we want to split the state management in a way that minimizes the state
update process on the sensors and that does not require any feedback from the control
node to the sensors.
For instance, a rule that can recognize a port scan attack can be implemented as a TCP
stream-based predicate on the sensors that take care of ﬁltering out packets that are part
of a ﬂow and a detection part on the control node that takes care of holding all the data
structures needed for detection such as list of targets and scanners, counters and timers,
or a whole graph implicit representation as described in [Gat06].
4.2 Architecture
Following the considerations drawn in Section 4.1, we now try to design an architecture
that implements our model.
In what follows, we describe the architecture in the context of network misuse detection,
but the architecture is general and it could be easily adapted to other domains. Also,
without any loss of generality, we describe the architecture and algorithms assuming that
a single signature is being matched at a given node. Multiple signatures matching can be
trivially added but it complicates our discussion unnecessarily3.
The proposed system scales the rule matching throughput of a sensor (i.e., a rule matching
machine) by using a parallel architecture as shown in Figure 4.1.
In our setup, packets are obtained from a tap (T) into the high-speed network link(s) that
copies the packets and sends them to a packet numbering unit (PNU), which, in turns,
tags the packets with a logical timestamp (e.g., generated using a counter starting from
zero)4 and forwards them to the splitter. The splitter, or scatterer, sends the traﬃc to N
3In a real-world setting performances could be enhanced by signatures' similarities as described in
[MMK05].
4Packet identiﬁers can either be written into unused or unneeded ﬁelds such as the source Ethernet
address, or can be prepended/appended to the original packet and encapsulated into a new packet being
aware of possible pitfalls originated with packets with size close to the link MTU.
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Figure 4.1: The architecture of the parallel rule matcher.
sensor nodes in charge of performing the detection activity in a round-robin fashion.
The sensor nodes are controlled by a control node that maintains the working state asso-
ciated with the attack instances. The sensor nodes forward any packet 5 that matched a
rule to the control node. The control node updates its state (the working state) according
to the messages sent by the sensors. In addition, the sensors are able to talk to each other
through a broadcast channel so when one of them matches a rule, the others can update
their predicate state (once again, the same for all) consistently.
Non-matching packets can be processed in any order by the parallel rule matcher while
matching packets should not. If a packet matches a rule, it could update the predicate
state of the sensors; therefore, we need some mechanism to ensure that packets encounter
the correct6 state at least once. A way to ensure this would be to place an explicit
synchronization (barrier) on the sensors in order to make the parallel matcher scan the
packets in the right order, one by one. Unfortunately this condition, even though simply
5More precisely, only the relevant attributes of the packet such as, for example, (such as, source or
destination IP) are forwarded to other sensors and control node.
6In this context correct means as it would be in a single, centralized, matcher.
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to enforce, would transform our parallel system back into a serial one.
The solution to this problem is that each sensor stores packets it has already scanned for
rule matches in a buﬀer called inter-node match buﬀer (INMB). This buﬀer is required in
case an earlier packet was matched by another node which triggered a sensor state change.
The rule with the new state loaded must be matched against packets that came after the
packet that triggered the state change (because this would happen in a serial rule matcher).
By carefully designing a protocol for removing unneeded packets from the INMBs, we
ensure that the set of nodes implement a parallel rule matching machine, i.e., the system
functions as if it were a single high-throughput rule matching machine.
By having a single control node, we avoid synchronization issues in the working state, but
we do not scale the state of the matching machine. We only scale its ability to ﬁlter out
the traﬃc that does not match the signature. For any well-written practical signature, the
amount of traﬃc that matches any rule is a very small fraction of the whole traﬃc, so
even this parallelization should increase the matching throughput by orders of magnitude.
Further parallelization may be obtained by having multiple control nodes (say M).
When the traﬃc is split in round-robin fashion, each node gets 1/Nth of the total through-
put and of course this can be scaled by increasing the number of nodes N .
Clearly, this architecture for a parallel rule matcher can be enhanced with other gen-
eral methods of parallelization, such as function parallelization (using separate systems
to match diﬀerent signatures), and component/subcomponent parallelization (for instance
reassembling TCP streams in a separate process) as described by Wheeler et al. in [WF07]
and discussed in Chapter 3.
Note that this model could sound similar to the well-known sensor model paradigm of
distributed intrusion detection [SBD+91]. The sensor model is a concept widely used in
distributed intrusion detection in order to monitor various locations in a network and it
aims at improving the accuracy of the system, not its speed. The sensors in a distributed
IDS work with independent states and do not need to synchronize with each other. These
sensors only preprocess events that will be later mined by a central component and do
not need any mutual feedback. Our model is diﬀerent since the sensors have to work
with a (hopefully little) portion of the state synchronized, and, therefore, they need to
communicate with each other in real-time.
4.3 Algorithms, Protocols, and Analysis
The architecture in the previous section requires an appropriate algorithm and protocol to
ensure correct matching. In this section, we present our proposed algorithm and protocol
and analyze its scaling properties.
4.3.1 Algorithm and Protocol
We present an algorithm, called sloppy rule matching that works for signatures that
give correct results even if packets being fed to a rule matching machine are reordered.
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In practice, we expect the sloppy rule matching to work very well also for other rules, in
particular we argue that with a careful design of the rules in term of state splitting (see
Section 4.1) it is possible to move all the order-invariant parts on the sensors and have the
ordered processing on the control node.
Naturally, sloppy rule matching is more eﬃcient and it is easier to analyze its scaling
properties under some reasonable assumptions. However, an exact rule matching would be
signiﬁcantly more complex and the scaling properties harder to evaluate.
It has to be noticed that the sloppy rule matching algorithm still needs that all the sensors
have the same predicate state. In order to enforce this we will provide a set of communica-
tion primitives that the sensors will call upon every match to synchronize with each other.
The sloppy rule matching simply eases the analysis of the system speedup but still needs
all the components described so far to be fully functional.
4.3.2 Sloppy Rule Matching
In this section, we discuss a parallel algorithm for rule matching that is correct except
for the reordering of some packets. More precisely, the parallel rule matching machine is
equivalent to a single rule matching machine with a packet reordering operation applied
to the input stream. The packet reordering will happen only over a small, localized part of
the stream, depending on the diﬀerence in the matching throughput between the slowest
and the fastest sensors. As such, in practical applications we do not expect this to cause
signiﬁcant problems. This rule matching algorithm correctly matches signatures that are
invariant with respect to the order of events, as well as signatures, such as port scan, that
are order invariant in practice. In fact, this sort of rule matching protocol is one of the
most eﬃcient ways to detect attacks such as port scan.
We now look at the parallel algorithm that implements sloppy rule matching. We assume
that all messages between a pair of sensors are transported using a FIFO messaging system.
Each sensor, say i, maintains the following variables:
• lastInspectedi: the packet id (recall that packets are tagged with increasing numbers
before getting to sensors) of the last packet inspected.
• pendingMatchesi: This is a priority queue arranged in the ascending order of the
value of packet id ki containing the matches that are pending, i.e., not acknowledged
by the other sensors yet. The head of the queue contains the packet id of the earliest
packet that needs to be retained at sensor i.
• earliestNeededj: The PacketId of the earliest needed packet at sensor j.
• ruleSeti: The rules loaded at sensor i.
• Bi: the buﬀer (Bi) in which packets are stored, ordered by packet id. Packets stored
in this buﬀer include those yet to be scanned, as well as those already scanned but
not discarded yet.
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Note that when we refer to packets as being earlier or later, we use packet id as the
ordering parameter; with smaller corresponding to earlier and greater corresponding to
later. In addition, when we say packet x we mean packet with packet id x.
Now we are ready to specify the algorithm, and we do so for one sensor i:
New packet available from network: insert it at the end of buﬀer Bi.
Scan: scan the next packet, say Pk, which is the packet immediately after the last inspected
packet (lastInspectedi) in Bi. Set lastInspectedi to k. If a match occurred, call
BroadcastMatch(), otherwise
BroadcastMatch(triggerMesg): if the packet matches a rule (say) rl then broadcast
< match(Pk, rl, i) > to all nodes including self. Add < k, triggerMesg, timestamp >
to the pendingMatchesi priority queue. The parameter triggerMesg may be null if
no other match triggered this match. Pk is the packet that matched. Of course, in a
real-world deployment only the relevant information needed by the other sensors will
be broadcast. As a last operation, the matching packet Pk is tagged with the rule id
that matched and is stored into the buﬀer.
ProcessMatch: a rule match < match(Pk, rl, j) > is received. Update rule set Ri ac-
cording to the action of the rule. For every new rule added by the action, scan the
packets up to and including lastInspectedi in buﬀer Bi that are after packet k for
a match against the newly added rules. For each match that occurs at packet h call
BroadcastMatch(< match(Ph, rm, i) >).
ProcessMatchAck(< MatchAck(Pk, rl, j) >) : Mark in pendingMatchesi that sensor j
has acknowledged < k, triggerMesg =< match(Ph, rm) >, timestamp >. If all the
nodes have acknowledged this match, remove< k, triggerMesg =< match(Ph, rm, j) >
, timestamp > from the priority queue pendingMatchesi and send a match acknowl-
edgment < MatchAck(Ph, rm, i) > to node j.
Calculate earliestNeededi: if pendingMatchesi is empty, then set earliestNeededi =
lastInspectedi, otherwise set it to the packet id at the head of the pendingMatches
queue.
Discard packets: let discardPtr be the minimum of earliestNeededj over all the nodes j.
Discard all packets in Bi that are earlier than discardPtr. The sensors communicate
to each other earliestNeededi using a non reliable version of the bully algorithm
[GM82] well-known distributed algorithm for leader election.
Send message to control node: all the packets earlier than discardPtr and tagged
with all the RuleId of the rules that have matched and are sent to the control node.
The control node has a reassembler that makes sure that the packets are processed
in the same order in which they appeared on the high-speed link.
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The bully algorithm, utilized to compute the discardPtr, simply states that not everyone
needs to broadcast its current earliestNeeded, but only who thinks to have the lowest
one. In the beginning, all the sensors think to have the lowest earliestNeeded, therefore
everyone broadcast it. After broadcasting, each sensor waits a time T 7 during which it
listens for answers by other sensors. Then it broadcast its own earliestNeededi only if this
is lower than all the ones received, otherwise it stops broadcasting.
During the time interval T , whichever sensor had the lowest earliestNeeded would have
broadcasted it as soon as received some greater earliestNeeded from other sensors. There-
fore, all the sensors know what the minimum earliestNeeded is.
The sensor that realizes to have won the election continues broadcasting its own earliestNeeded,
which is going to change during the processing because its pendingMatches queue can
change. By doing this, it allows other sensors to re-match the contention if their earliestNeeded
becomes lower.
All the sensors can discard the packets from their INMBs periodically (an appropriate
timer can be utilized to trigger discards). More precisely, the sensors can discard packets
associated with the last discardPtr seen that has been stable for a given suitable time.
This deferred deletion ensures that the transitory associated with the contention when
the discardPtr changes has passed, so that there is not any packet needed earlier than
discardPtr8.
The canonical bully algorithm prescribes an acknowledgment for each communication, but
since this would complicate unnecessarily the protocol, we omit it and we call this version
of the protocol non reliable bully algorithm .
Correctness
We show correctness of the sloppy matching algorithm in two steps. First, we show that
all packets are inspected by all the rules in the rule set, i.e., no packets are discarded
without being scanned. Then, we show that the matching is equivalent to a packet-reordered
matching.
To show that no packets are discarded without being scanned we note the key fact that if x
matches at sensor n, then earliestNeededn will not move beyond x (because the sensor is
waiting for acknowledgments) until all other nodes have examined their buﬀers for matches
triggered by this match, and matches triggered by matches triggered by this match, and
so on.
Showing that the matching done by this algorithm is equivalent to a packet reordered
matching is intuitively clear: a sketch of the proof follows.
If the two following conditions hold:
1. the states of the sensors are synchronized, that is, all the sensors have the same state
7If the event density over time in the stream read by a sensor is suﬃciently high, then T could be
an event count. In this way, the heartbeat of the system becomes the average inter-arrival time between
events.
8This does not mean that the discardPtr is the highest possible, other legitimate discardPtrs could
have been arrived during the back-oﬀ period. This makes the INMB purging operation conservative.
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loaded; and
2. there are no pending matches,
then is trivial to see that the ﬁrst packet will be scanned against all the rules in the same
state since all the sensors have the same predicate state loaded.
If the packet does not match, then the conditions above remain unmodiﬁed and every new
non matching packet will go through all the rules.
When a packet matches according to the sloppy algorithm, a match message is sent to the
other sensors in order to make them update their scanning state.
If the matched packet was not the earliestNeeded then there will be at least a sensor that
will update its state and scan the new rule state through its INMB.
In this case, it can happen then that two diﬀerent packets y and w later than x match
causing a state update that is broadcast again.
Now, any other packet z later than x, y and w and present in the INMB of a sensor i
will be scanned against a state PSi, which is function of the relative ordering in which
i will receive match notiﬁcation about x, y, and w. This relative order is determined by
contingent conditions and relative instantaneous speeds of the sensors in scanning packets.
In a more formal way, we deﬁne the ﬁnal state reached by i as the result of the iterative
application of the transition function F to a starting state S0 present on the sensor before
the matching of x occurred. The ﬁnal state Sk can thus be deﬁned as:
Sk = F (Ik−1, F (Ik−2, F (. . . S0)))). (4.1)
For the sake of clarity we write Equation 4.1 as:
Sk = F
k(Ik−1, Ik−2 · · ·S0). (4.2)
where Ik−1, Ik−2 · · · is the ordered tuple (sequence) of input encountered by the sensor.
Now, if for each permutation pi applied to the input sequence F k(Ik−1, Ik−2 · · ·S0) =
F k(pi(Ik−1, Ik−2 · · · ), S0), then the transition function is said to be order-invariant9.
Loosely speaking, order-invariant rules have actions that modify the state in a non de-
structive way (for instance, a counter that is incremented, or an element added to an
unordered list). For example, suppose that a match occurs at a packet x. If there are two
or more nodes with lastInspected > x then we need the order-invariance property, because
the relative speed at which the nodes scan their buﬀers could cause diﬀerent state updates.
For instance, consider the sensors in the conﬁguration below, where each sensor is paired
with the ordered list of packets it is going to scan:
sensor1 4
sensor2 8 7 5 6
sensor3 12 11 10 9
sensor4 15 14 13
9We can also say that the transition function, and therefore the signature associated with it, is c-order
invariant if the relations holds for each c-bounded permutation |pic(i)− 1| ≤ c.
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if id == 7 then i++ else if id== 11 then i--
rule 2)
if i==1 and id==15 then do_something()
When sensor1 matches the ﬁrst rule the match is broadcast to sensors 1,2,3,4 and all the
sensors load the new rule state and start looking for packet 7 and 11 in their INMB.
1. If sensor2 is faster than sensor3, it will match 7, increment i, and broadcast its match
(modifying the value of i in the other sensors too);
2. otherwise, sensor3 will match 11 decrement i and broadcast its match (modifying the
value of i in the other sensors too, since i is part of the sensor scanning state and it
is synchronized).
Depending on what happens ﬁrst between 1 and 2, sensor4, which is scanning 15, will
execute do_something() or not (having seen in consecutive times i = 0,−1, 0 or i = 0, 1, 0
depending on who won the race). It has to be noticed that with the proposed paradigm,
which splits scanning states from working state, the rule before would have been imple-
mented more wisely in 2 parts:
1. a stateless rule on the sensors in the form:
if id in [4,7,11,15] then forward, and





15: if i==1: do_something()
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In this way, the execution order is well-deﬁned, does not suﬀer from race conditions, and
is equivalent to the sequential stream.
Note that thanks to the reassembler on the control node, all the packets tagged to be
dangerous get to the sensor in the right order. Given that, it is really unnecessary to
implement complicate rules potentially order-dependent. It is better to keep rule predicates
order-invariant and move all the order-sensitive parts in the control node, instead. This is
a rule of thumb, not a proof, though.
4.3.3 Exact Rule Matching
We now sketch how the sloppy algorithm should be modiﬁed to handle and resolve possible
conﬂicts raised by order-sensitive signatures. The basic idea is that the packet discarding
algorithm works as before, but, in this case, when a packet at a sensor matches a rule, the
sensor registers and broadcasts a tentative match. Upon registering/receiving a tentative
match, all the reversible rule actions are carried out by all the sensors. A tentative match
is conﬁrmed and irreversible actions are performed once the matched packet is ready to be
discarded according to the packet discard algorithm. If the node receives a message from
another node about a conﬂicting match to an earlier packet, a tentative match is discarded
and its actions rolled back.
The concept of a conﬂict is simple, but its speciﬁcation is a bit more complicated: a conﬂict
occurs if a rule matched an earlier packet and the corresponding rule action invalidates
the tentative match directly (e.g., it removes the rule or modiﬁes its state.). Clearly, only
rules that belong to the same signature may conﬂict. Thus, we only have to check any new
tentative match against all same-signature rule matches on later packets, in order to ﬁnd
all conﬂicts.
A complete speciﬁcation of the exact rule matching would require the deﬁnition of the
methods in charge to perform the conﬂict checking and rollback operations described above.
Since such a complicate protocol is not required for most of the real-life signatures, we
provide an analysis just for the sloppy algorithm and leave the formalization of the exact
rule matcher for future work.
4.4 Analysis
In this section, we analyze the scaling properties of the architecture. In particular, we show
that a system based on parallel sensors has a higher rule matching throughput than a
single-node systems when the number of sensors in the system is larger than or equal to a
threshold NT . More precisely, we show that the throughput of the system increases with
the number of sensors N .
Note that we will only analyze the sloppy matching case. The exact matching behavior
depends on the number of conﬂicts and rollbacks, and hence it is harder to analyze. We
will analyze the cost (in terms of time) for matches as well as for non-matches separately,
and then we will combine the costs to get an idea of how well the system performs. The
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cost Cn(i) of handling non-matching packets for the i-th sensor in a system with N sensors
is:
Cn(i) = CS + CsU + CrU ·N. (4.3)
where CS is the cost of scanning a packet against the rule set, and CsU is the cost of sending
(using network broadcast) periodic updates of discardPtr to the other N −1 sensors while
CrU is the cost for each sensor to receive the update.
We suppose here that the bully algorithm is working in stationary conditions, and that the
leader with lowest earliestNeeded has been elected and keeps on sending updates to other
sensors every T packets. Since each update has to be received by all the N nodes the CrU
is multiplied by N .







For moderate N , the cost of receiving discardPtr updates can be made small enough, so
that we can ignore the second term in the denominator. In this case, considering that the
throughput for a single node matcher is 1/CS, we see that the throughput is approximately
N times that of a single node rule matching machine (with low CsU and CrU compared to
N). Also, consider the case of very large N , then the throughput becomes 1/(CrU).
Therefore, our parallel rule matching machine's throughput saturates at a value which
depends on the frequency of updates of discardPtr.
It has to be noticed that, in the worst case, the bully algorithm could behave like a
dummy all-to-all broadcast algorithm. If the leader (i.e., the sensor with the minimum
earliestNeeded) changes frequently, every T new contention for the leader election is
started. In this case, the cost for sending and receiving discardPtr has to be multiplied by
N (all the sensors send the update every T events and all the sensors receive the update
sent by all the others).





+ CsU + CrU ·N
. (4.5)
That goes to zero for a high number of sensors.
The formulae above hides the fact that the cost associated with discardPtr update CsU
and CrU can be chosen by the system designer and can be arbitrary low. Loosely speaking,
if we had inﬁnite memory we would not worry about discarding unneeded packets and
then we will avoid the buﬀer synchronization mechanism and its pitfalls. Following this
consideration, increasing the maximum INMB size of the sensors and, therefore, increasing
the period of earliestNeeded broadcasts, would shrink the costs CsU and CrU arbitrary.
In this case, even if the asymptotic analysis above is still valid, the system will not suﬀer
from the cost associated with the updates for values of N that can be encountered in the
real world. Given this consideration, for the analysis that follows we will suppose that the
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bully algorithm works in stationary conditions as reported in Equation 4.4.
Now we take into consideration the analysis in the case of matching sensors and we suppose
that every packet causes a match. The analysis in the case of matching sensors is more
complicated. The worst case cost is one broadcast/acknowledgment per match, and sensors
have to scan their entire INMB for each match. Let us consider the analysis separately for
the sensors and for the control node.
For the i-th sensor of an N -sensor system we have:
Cm(i) = CS + CsB + SB ·N + CPS ·N + CsU + CrU ·N, (4.6)
where CsB is the cost of broadcasting (send) the match message to the other nodes (using
network broadcast it is just paid once for each match) and SB is the size of the INMB. CPS
is the cost, for every node, of receiving the broadcast message and updating its predicate
state (thus, the factor is multiplied by N)
The product SB ·N deserves further investigation. As stated in Section 4.3.1, when a new
matching for the packet x modiﬁes the sensor state, then all the packets later than x
that are in the INMB are scanned against the new rule state. The cost of this additional
scanning is diﬃcult to analyze, but we attempt to estimate it using the diﬀerential state
concept.
We deﬁne diﬀerential state the diﬀerence between two consecutive states visited by a sensor.
The term diﬀerence is used improperly, since it is not clear what we are diﬀerencing and
this is not an algebraic or a set-wise diﬀerence. Intuitively, this diﬀerence denotes the
new information added to the state with respect to the predicate to which the state is
applied. For instance, if the state of a sensor contains a list of destination IP address
then the diﬀerential state can be a new IP added to the list, if the state we are taking into
consideration is a counter, then the diﬀerence is simply the algebraic diﬀerence between the
values before and after the update. In the most favorable scenario, each packet in the INMB
later than x have to be checked against only the diﬀerential state dSx,x+1 = (Sx+1 − Sx),
and if the cost of this checking is proportional to the dimension of the diﬀerential state,
that is CSx+1 = CdSx,x+1+CSx, this would be equivalent to what happens in a serial machine
where the cost Cx+1 is spent all in one. Unfortunately, this sort of additive cost property
with respect to state is not likely to hold. For instance, if a value in a packet, let's say
the TTL, has to be checked against a counter, the cost of the comparison would not be
additive at all: the cost of comparing Cc≥?k+1 6= (Cc≥?k+Cc≥?k+1). However, if the state we
are handling is a list, then we could check later packets just against the new values added
to the list, and in this case we will have Cc∈L|T ≈ (Cc∈L + Cc∈V ) (the symbol | represent
the concatenation operator).
If the cost of scanning later packets against the new loaded state is additive, the cost of
scanning the INMB should be neglected from equation (4.6) when considering the perfor-
mance of the parallel sensor versus the single machine. This is because the cost of scanning
the INMB would be the same cost spent on a serial machine that had received the packets
in the correct order, and therefore, tested the later packets versus the state modiﬁcation
caused by the earlier ones.
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In this case, the formulas for both the serial and the parallel sensors should be corrected
to take into account that the scanning cost of matching (and non-matching) packets is not
constant, since the state increases after matching. We can replace CS with its mean value
CˆS averaged on the event stream.
If the cost is not additive, the parallel system incurs in a performance penalty with respect
to the single-sensor system. The worst penalty possible happens when the cost for scanning
the diﬀerential state generated by a match in a later packet is equal to the cost to scan
the state itself (see the example of the counter above).
In that case, the additional cost with respect to a serial matcher that the parallel sensor
has to pay will be a ﬁxed CˆS multiplied by the average number of late packets with respect
to x. This number is diﬃcult to estimate, but we can safely say that it is proportional to
the number of sensors if the splitter splits the traﬃc in a round-robin fashion10. Therefore,
the additional cost would become SB ·O(N)
Now we take into consideration the control node. The cost in case of matching is:
CM(C) = CR + CWS, (4.7)
where CR is the cost of receiving the update message and CWS is the cost spent updating
the working state (paid once).
Let us now consider the throughput of the system of N nodes, when every packet matches.
The throughput for a single node machine is 1
CS+CM
(where CM is the actual cost derived
by matching, that is, updating the rule state) and with respect to sensors the throughput





+ SB + CPS + CrU
. (4.8)





therefore, the total throughput becomes:
TM = min(TMS , α · TMC ), (4.10)
where α is a multiplicative constant which denotes how many times the control node is
faster than the sensors11.
10Intuitively, suppose we have N sensors numbered from 1 to N and a round-robin splitter which sends
packets in increasing order with respect to the sensors. Now, the worst possible case for matching in terms
of INMB rescanning happens when the ﬁrst packet matches. Later packets have already reached other
sensors and will be in their INMB. If the ﬁrst packet matches, then all the other sensors have to scan
exactly one packet in their buﬀer, thus making the whole INMB scans a O(N) operation.
11This constant is needed to take into account that sensors and control node can be diﬀerent kind of
machines, possibly with diﬀerent hardware.
α comes handy if we want to decouple mathematically the two sensors and take into consideration a
possible increase in the computational power of the control node. If the control node doubled its processing
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For a mixture of traﬃc with matching probability p the total throughput of the parallel
machine is (as a function of the probability p):





+ SB + CPS) · p+ (CSN ) · (1− p) + CsUN + CrU
,
α
p · (CM + CR)
)
(4.11)
These equations conﬁrm the hypothesis done in Section 4.1 about what the bottleneck in
such a designed parallel system is. The non-scaling part of the equation, apart from the
earliestNeeded update, which under some hypothesis can be neglected, is the SB + CPS
part, regarding the sensor state update, which has to be accomplished on every sensors,
and for each match.
Those costs are not parallelizable. According to the Amdahl's law, the total achievable






where F is the fraction of a calculation that is sequential (i.e., cannot beneﬁt from paral-
lelization), and (1−F ) is the fraction that can be parallelized. In this case F = SB +CPS,
but if we had not split the rule state in SP and SW we would have had F = SB+CPS+CM
(where CPS + CM represents the cost of updating the whole rule state ) in our equations
that would have further lowered the achievable speedup.
4.5 Optimizations
The general model described before can be optimized in a real-world setup. In particular,
the approach of reducing the cost impact of the sensor state update could be achieved
relaxing the assumption (2) and exploiting some a priori knowledge to send related packet
with respect to a signature to the same sensor.
If such a knowledge exists, then the fact (2) doesn't hold anymore and this means that
there is no need to have all the sensors to behave in the same manner (i.e., have the same
state). In other words, this means that the sensor state can be partitioned into independent
substates that can be updated separately and in a decoupled way. This is made possible
by the event space partitioning induced by the signature being matched.
If there is no need for inter-sensor state update, equations 4.11 becomes:






p · (CM + CR)
)
, (4.13)
because the costs for sending and receiving state updates among the sensors disappears
and even the cost for buﬀer synchronization is not needed anymore.
power we can highlight this either by dividing CM +CR by two (because the cost seen by it would be half)
or doubling α. This second formalism is much clearer.
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In this way, we can ﬁnd the models discussed in Chapter 3 as a special case of the model
described here. A very common example of this kind of optimization is to split the traﬃc
so that packets belonging to same TCP streams are mapped to the same sensors. These
sensors use signature of non cross-connection attacks.
If the signature matched on the sensor is TCP-connection-friendly, then all the matching
process can be performed in parallel on the sensors, in addition the control node can be





which denotes clearly the maximum achievable speedup and is consistent with what we
have stated in Chapter 3.
It is remarkable to notice that reintroducing the control node in such a design can still add
power to the architecture adding statefulness to TCP-ﬂow-related signature. For instance,
the sensor could run a stateless connection-wise signature that tags as possibly dangerous
every HTTP payload containing an operation regarding cookie manipulation. Then, the
control node could correlate the (possible huge) relevant traﬃc in order to ﬁnd misuse in
cookie manipulations (such as cookie tampering). This two-step hierarchical approach has
been successfully employed in a number of real-world architectures [Roe99, Pax98].
It has to be noticed that the above optimizations are possible only discarding the general
assumptions on which our model is based in favor of more specialized ones. In the general
case, the equation (4.11) still holds and gives us an upper bound of how far an IDS can be
parallelized for a generic signature.
It remains to be said that in the described architecture are still applicable all the single-
sensor optimizations discussed in Chapter 3, namely techniques to optimize the rule match-
ing by reducing the single sensor analysis run time such as [MMK05] and [LZL+06] or to




In this chapter, we will describe how the model proposed in Chapter 4 has been imple-
mented in a demonstrative -yet working- real-world system. We will focus on the imple-
mentation of the sloppy rule matcher only.
We start by outlining the domain where the parallel rule matcher is designed to work. We
tried to implement the system in the most generic way possible, but, since the implemen-
tation employs low level network primitive, we had to specialize it in order to handle a
speciﬁc link-level protocol, that is Ethernet. Nevertheless, the proposed implementation
could be easily adapted to other kinds of network technologies (e.g., Myrinet [Myr]) since
the Ethernet-speciﬁc code is encapsulated into a general-purpose library.
In the same fashion, in order to work with raw sockets at the link-level, we used the
PF_PACKET/SOCK_RAW family socket interface available in GNU/Linux >=2.2. As
before, our implementation can be easily ported to other OSs that have features similar to
the ones provided by the packet sockets since the OS-dependent code is well encapsulated
in a well deﬁned library.
The implementation has been supported by a network emulation environment that helped
ease the development and testing of the system. Having the possibility to seamlessly test
the whole system on a single laptop, with all the logging information from diﬀerent nodes
merged into a single buﬀer was instrumental in understanding the subtle issues related to
concurrency that are very important when designing a parallel system.
Some eﬀort has been spent to have the emulated network testbed exposing the same in-
terface of a real network testbed in order to be able to deploy the same parallel system in
both the emulated and the real-world environment without any changes in conﬁguration
or building.
An overview of the available implementation choices follows. In this chapter, the emphasis
will be put on the software part of the implementation, that is, the implementation of the
parallel protocol described in Chapter 4. In the next chapter, we will provide a more precise
description of the issues related to the deployment of the system in both the emulated and
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the real-world network testbed.
5.2 Possible Implementation Choices
The choice of how to implement the parallel sensors and the control node has been a crucial
one. Loosely speaking, two possibilities were available:
1. writing the parallel intrusion detection system from scratch, or
2. enhancing a current intrusion detection system with the parallel protocol and algo-
rithms described in the previous chapter.
Both solutions have pros and cons. Solution 1 is simpler to implement since it would not
have required any knowledge of code written by others. In addition, since designed from
scratch as a parallel engine, ad hoc optimizations and features could have been implemented
seamlessly without having to struggle with the lack of ﬂexibility of an already consolidated
centralized architecture. As a downside, a from-scratch solution would not have gained
from the collateral features that usually come with the commercial IDS, that is, a wide
range of plugin and signature descriptions that the developer community or the vendors
provide to the end user in order to transform a simple detector engine into a real-world,
eﬀective intrusion detection system. On the other hand, Solution 2 allows us to reuse some
common functionalities of intrusion detection system such as the packet capture framework,
the logging architecture, and the protocol decoding. For these reasons, in addition to the
possibility to be able to exploit a great deal of plugins and signature descriptions, we have
chosen the Solution 2. Even thought this choice has implied some additional eﬀorts in
order to understand the previous work and to adapt it to a parallel environment, it has
also allowed us to save lines of code exploiting the IDS common functionalities. In addition,
as we will see in Section 6.3, choosing an existing system has allowed us to exploit and
enhance a real world signature such as a port scan.
As reported in Chapter 2, there are many IDSs that we could have leveraged for our parallel
engine. We have chosen to implement the parallel sensor through a custom version of the
Snort IDS [Roe99]
The choice of Snort has been lead by the importance that this engine has gained in recent
years in the open source intrusion detection community.
Snort is actively developed and has a wide community that provides collateral support,
such as signatures descriptions (rules) [JA], plugins, and documentation.
To sum it up, we have chosen Snort because, using the words that appear on the Snort
homepage: with millions of downloads to date, Snort is the most widely deployed intrusion
detection and prevention technology worldwide and has become the de facto standard for
the industry
In addition to the popularity that Snort has gained in the open source community, Snort
is the system that the scientiﬁc community employs as a benchmark for detection accuracy
measures (see for instance: [SYB06]) or as the basis to implement new features (see for
instance: [CM06]).
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5.3 Snort
Snort is an open source intrusion detection and prevention system capable of performing
traﬃc analysis on IP networks. As reported by the Snort web-site it can perform pro-
tocol analysis, content searching/matching and can be used to detect a variety of attacks
and probes, such as buﬀer overﬂows, stealth port scans, CGI attacks, SMB probes, OS
ﬁngerprinting attempts, and much more.
Snort is free software, available with full source code under the terms of the GNU GPL
and it can be downloaded from http://www.snort.org/
Snort has three primary functional uses. It can be used as a normal packet sniﬀer like
tcpdump, as a packet logger (useful for network traﬃc debugging, etc.), or as a full blown
network intrusion detection and prevention 1 system.
The major strong points of Snort are its ﬂexible rule language utilized to describe signa-
tures and the modular plugin architecture that allows detections and reporting subsystem
to be extended.
Snort Subsystems
As reported in [Roe99] Snort is made up of three primary subsystems.
The packet decoder subsystem is based on the libpcap sniﬃng library and is orga-
nized around the layers of the protocol stack present in the supported data-link and
TCP/IP protocol deﬁnitions. Each subroutine in the decoder in charge of decoding
a speciﬁc protocol is called in the order determined by the current protocol stack,
from the data link layer, through the transport layer, up to the application layer. The
majority of the work of the decoder routines is to set pointers into the data structure
that represents the decoded packet for later analysis by the detection engine.
The detection engine subsystem is the Snort core. It performs rule matching against
the decoded packets.
Snortmaintains its detection rules in a two dimensional linked list of what are termed
Chain Headers and Chain Options. These are lists of rules that have been condensed
down to a list of common attributes in the Chain Headers, with the detection modiﬁer
options contained in the Chain Options. These rule chains are searched recursively
for each packet in both directions. The detection engine checks only those chain
options that have been set by the rules parser at run-time. The ﬁrst rule that matches
a decoded packet in the detection engine triggers the action speciﬁed in the rule
deﬁnition and returns.
The logging and alerting subsystem provides real-time alerting capability by, incor-
porating alerting mechanisms for syslog, a user speciﬁed ﬁle, a UNIX socket, or
WinPopup messages to Windows clients using Samba's smbclient.
1For an overview of the intrusion prevention capabilities, see the Snort inline mode [Roe]
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Program conﬁguration, rules parsing, and data structure generation takes place before the
sniﬀer section is initialized, keeping the amount of per packet processing to the minimum
required to achieve the base program functionality.
Plugins
Snort architecture is based on plugins. Plugins allow the detection and reporting subsys-
tems to be extended. There are three types of plugin currently available in Snort, the
following list sketches them brieﬂy.
Detection plugins check a single aspect of a packet for a value deﬁned within a rule and
determine if the packet data meets their acceptance criteria. For example, the TCP
ﬂags detection plugin checks the ﬂags section of TCP packets for matches with ﬂag
combinations deﬁned in a particular rule. Detection plugins may be called multiple
times per packet with diﬀerent arguments.
Preprocessors are only called a single time per packet and may perform highly complex
functions like TCP stream reassembly, IP de-fragmentation, or HTTP request nor-
malization. They can directly manipulate packet data and even call the detection
engine directly with their modiﬁed data. They can perform less complex tasks like
statistics gathering or threshold monitoring as well.
Output plugins are called when an event or an alert are generated. For instance, an
output plugin could save alerts and logs into a database instead of writing them into
a text ﬁle.
Since version 2.6, Snort was enhanced with dynamically loadable modules. They can be
loaded via directives in snort.conf or via command-line options and can perform the same
types of operation of their static counterpart but, in addition, can be loaded at runtime
without rebuilding the engine.
5.4 Patching Snort
Snort has been taken as a basis for the development of the distributed rule matcher
described in Chapter 4 both for the sensors and the control node.
Even though sensors are diﬀerent from the control node from the implementation point of
view2, we decided to base both components on Snort. This choice has been taken in order
to maximize the code reuse in the implementation. As a matter of fact, both the sensors
and the control node use some common functionalities provided by Snort, such as the log
system, and both use preprocessors, even though diﬀerent ones 3
2For instance, while sensors have to process traﬃc and communicate with each other, control nodes
need just to passively receive and process the signals sent by the sensors.
3We will see in the next chapter that for the proof-of-concept incarnation of parallel port scan detection
the sensors will be equipped with the flow preprocessor while the control node will run the sfportscan
preprocessor.
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Here follows a general description of the methodology used to transform Snort into the
parallel rule matcher. A detailed description of the features implemented for the speciﬁc
tasks of sensors and control node will be provided in the following sections.
As a ﬁrst step, we downloaded and installed the sources of a vanilla Snort package, version
2.6.0.2, with all the preprocessors, and put the sources under version control (using the
subversion system).
In order to get acquainted with the Snort codebase, we found it very useful to run doxygen
on Snort sources. doxygen [vH] is a well-known documentation generator for C++, C, Java,
Objective-C, Python, IDL and is usually used to generate online documentation from a set
of documented source ﬁles. However, doxygen can be extremely helpful, as in this case, to
extract the code structure of an application from undocumented source ﬁles. This is useful
to quickly ﬁnd the way in large source distributions.
The relevant part of a sample doxygen conﬁguration useful to get acquainted with a large















Some of the more helpful meta-data have been the call, include, and included_by graphs
that doxygen can create if used in conjunction with the dot package to draw graphs. By
using those graphs, it has been rather easy to follow the journey of a packet from its capture
through the decoding steps and to the detection part, and, therefore, this has eased the
task to transform Snort into a parallel rule matcher.
Before branching the Snort codebase in two separate repositories and develop the sensors
and the control node functionality independently, two features were added to the main
codebase:
1. a common debug functionality, and
2. a common way for the sensors and the control node to recognize each other.
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The feature 1 enhances Snort debug system with a new functionality. Snort debug ver-
bosity is driven by the environment variable SNORT_DEBUG. Every time in the Snort
code appears a call to the debug macro DEBUG_WRAP as the following:
DEBUG_WRAP(DebugMessage (DEBUG_DIST, "Setup pcap_loop\n" ) ; ) ;
Snort performs the bitwise AND between the ﬁrst parameter of DebugMessage and the
value of the environment variable SNORT_DEBUG and logs the correspondent output to
the console if the result of the operation is not null.
We have added a new debug constant:
#define DEBUG_DIST 0x08000000 /∗ 134217728 ∗/
that is the lowest power of two not used as other debug constant. We pass it as ﬁrst
parameter of the DebugMessage function every time we to log something related to
the parallel matcher add-ons. In order to visualize the debug information during runtime,
Snort has to be started after having setting the environment variable SNORT_DEBUG to
a relevant value (in our case, we wanted to have printed only debug information regarding
to the parallel rule matcher so we set SNORT_DEBUG=134217728 (the decimal value of
DEBUG_DIST)
Feature 2 was required because both the sensors and the control node need to know each
other, which means that each of them needs to know:
1. how many sensors are collaborating;
2. who the collaborating sensors are.
The reason why the sensors cannot be cooperation oblivious, that is they cannot ignore
what the players of the parallel detection system are, is subtle. As explained in Section 4.3.1,
each sensors can remove a match from the pendingMatches priority queue only when all
the sensors have acknowledged it. In order to keep track of which sensors have acknowledge
the matching, each sensor needs to know which sensors are going to acknowledge messages,
or, said in other words, which sensors are running.
Note that, in an unacknowledged communication system, sensors would not need to know
who the other sensors are, since a broadcast send primitive allows a single sender to reach
all the receivers on a network, regardless of their number and identity.
Since sensors communicate to each other by means of Ethernet packets (we will describe
this more precisely in the following chapters) a simple way to identify sensory is using their
MAC address of the interface connected on the control network.
For this reason Snort has been enhanced with a new command option:
{"mac− l i s t f i l e " , LONGOPT_ARG_REQUIRED, NULL, MAC_LIST_FILE} ,
by means of which it is possible to specify the name of a ﬁle containing a list of Ethernet
MAC addresses: the addresses of the sensors that are part of the rule matcher. By con-
vention, the ﬁrst MAC appearing in the ﬁle is the control node MAC address (needed by
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sensors to send information to the control node) followed by a list of the MAC address of
the other sensors. All the sensors are fed with the same ﬁle, in order to have all the same
picture of the players in the communication.
The relevant logic to parse the ﬁle and load the information is trivial and has been imple-
mented but it is not reported here.
After these two modiﬁcations the repository has been split in two branches: the snort-sensor
and the snort-control branches.
5.4.1 Logical Network Architecture
In order to go on with the description of the implementation details for sensor and control
nodes we ﬁrst need to understand how the sensors are connected to each other.
From the networking point of view, each sensor is provided with two network interfaces:
the usual interface used by the IDS to perform packet capture and another interface used
to communicate with other sensors and the control node.
The capture interface is connected to the distribution network (only Ethernet level, with-
out IP support) of the splitter. The control interfaces are connected to another Ethernet
network, which also contains the control node.
In the next chapter, a more detailed and hardware-oriented description of how the network
has been deployed will be given. For now, it is suﬃcient to know the aforementioned details
in order to understand the following considerations.
5.4.2 Sensors
The sensor has been the component that required the most development time because it
contains most of the logic of the parallel rule matcher.
The main modiﬁcation to the Snort packet ﬂow, which is the main entry point for the
parallel rule matcher logic, was represented by the implementation of the inter-node com-
munication system.
This has ﬁrst required Snort to be enhanced with a new command option that speci-
ﬁes which interface should be used to communicate with other sensors, named control-
interface (the code snippet follows).
{" cont ro l−i n t e r f a c e " , LONGOPT_ARG_REQUIRED, NULL, CONTROL_INTERFACE} ,
This option has to be passed to Snort via the command line in order to specify the interface
from which it should expect control packets (e.g., control-interface=eth1).
From now on, we will refer to the packets exchanged between the sensors in order to
implement the sloppy rule matching algorithm as control packets and to the network
device used by the sensor to send/receive control packets as control interface.
Sensors must handle the packet capture and the inter-sensor communications at the same
time. This implies that the sensors must process packets coming from the two interfaces
concurrently, which is a major diﬀerence from the standard way of operating of Snort.
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There are many solutions to implement this concurrent behavior. A list of the most often
used solutions follows.
1. Instruct the libpcap library, upon which Snort is based, to capture packets from
both the interfaces. Some userland demultiplexer then performs control or detection
operations according to the type of the decoded packets.
2. Use two separate threads to read from the two interfaces and then employ condition
variables to synchronize between the two.
3. Do not use any concurrency. The two streams of packets are time-multiplexed by
simply polling the control socket (set in non-blocking mode) every time the pcap
callback function is called to deliver a new captured packet.
Solution 1 is be the simplest to implement, since the management of the concurrency
remains concealed in the libpcap library, which would be in charge of merging control
packets and traﬃc and make them appear to the Snort process as a single stream of
packets. In that way it is easy to implement the logic to handle control packets diverting
them from the main packet stream without synchronization problems because the kernel
socket buﬀers ensure that there are no lost packets while the sensor is taking care of the
control operations.
Unfortunately, in order to make the libpcap library capture from two or more interfaces it
is necessary to conﬁgure it to listen on the Linux any interface. The Linux "any" cooked-
mode interface gets all the packets received (or transmitted) on any interface (including
the localhost loopback interface) in both directions (incoming and outgoing packets). Since
the diﬀerent interfaces do not have the same link-layer header (e.g., for localhost loopback
there is no Ethernet header) the any interface uses a special pseudo-link-layer header,
described in libpcap/sll.h and a diﬀerent data link type. The problem with the Linux
cooked mode interface is that it is extremely ineﬃcient because all the packets, both in
incoming and outgoing directions, are cooked and copied to the userland. The unnecessary
copies can be avoided by setting up an appropriate pcap ﬁlter, however the time spent for
cooking packets is not negligible.
The Solution 2 is eﬀective and does not suﬀer from the drawbacks of the previous one.
Nevertheless, it implies a heavy refactoring of the Snortmain loop in order to accommodate
the two reader threads, and the use of thread condition variables to prevent races between
traﬃc and control packets that could be originated by a match.
Solution 3 is good under diﬀerent points of view. First of all, it does not require any kind
of concurrent management of the two interfaces. In addition it is very little invasive, since
it requires just to add a single entry point in the main Snort loop inside the pcap callback
function, before the captured packets are processed.
In details, the code snippet below shows how the hooks for the processing of the control
packets are plugged into the callback function of the main pcap capture loop.
1 void PcapProcessPacket (char ∗user ,
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2 struct pcap_pkthdr ∗ pkthdr , u_char ∗ pkt )
3 {
4 PROFILE_VARS;
5 PREPROC_PROFILE_START( t o t a lP e r f S t a t s ) ;
6
7 /∗ F i r s t t h in g we do i s proces s a Usr s i g n a l t h a t we caught ∗/
8 i f ( s ig_check ( ) )
9 {




14 /∗ Process a l l t he c on t r o l packe t s f i r s t ∗/
15
16 pc . t o t a l++;
17 i f ( ! skip_forward )
18 {
19 rece ive_contro l_packet (pv . contro l_socket ) ;
20 DEBUG_WRAP(DebugMessage (DEBUG_DIST,
21 "After r e c e i v i n g con t r o l packet \n" ) ; ) ;
22 }
23 . . .
The receive_control_packet function, at line 19, is the main entry point (thus not the
only one) of the parallel rule matcher. We will discuss later why it is executed conditionally
under the !skip_forward guard.
Inside receive_control_packet a poll is performed on a packet socket opened in non-
blocking mode and listening on the control interface, so that all the control packets that
are waiting in the control socket buﬀer queue are read and processed.
Note that this protocol is not starvation-free since if the control node gets congested only
control packets will be processed and the traﬃc will probably be discarded.
It has to be noticed that this condition should never occur since the sloppy rule matching
protocol has been designed in order to minimize the communications among sensors, so we
can say that we can safely take this risk.
This solution also helps eliminate races among traﬃc and control packets. Control packets
have always the priority upon traﬃc packets and the actions that they trigger, if any, are
processed thoroughly before any other traﬃc packet is being analyzed.
In addition to the one just described, there are other two entry points in the Snort packet
capture control ﬂow where the control is passed to the parallel rule matcher logic, which
are:
- the asynchronous access to parallel primitives called from inside the matching rules
in order to, among other things, notify the matching to other nodes, and
- the primitives called by Snort to hand out a (hopefully shallow) copy of the received
packets to the parallel INMB.
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We ﬁrst take into consideration the latter since is the most easily explainable.
A slight modiﬁcation has to be done to the Snort core engine in order to have each sensor
saving into its INMB the traﬃc packets captured by Snort. Recall that the parallel matcher
needs a buﬀer to store packets already analyzed in order to perform detection operations
on them with respect to new rules added remotely by other sensor. Snort per se discards
each packet right after processing it, so we need to implement the logic to store the packets
into the INMB instead of disposing them after processing.
We have implemented the INMB as a circular buﬀer, ordered by packet id (the order is
enforced at insertion time). Each packet is saved into this buﬀer after being decoded and
before being passed to the preprocessor and detection chain.
1 void ProcessPacket (char ∗user ,
2 struct pcap_pkthdr ∗ pkthdr , u_char ∗ pkt , void ∗ f t )
3 {
4 Packet p ;
5
6 . . .
7 (∗ g r inde r ) (&p , pkthdr , pkt ) ;
8
9 . . .
10 switch ( runMode )
11 {
12
13 . . .
14 case MODE_IDS:
15
16 . . .
17 i f ( ! skip_forward ) put_buffer(&p ) ;
18
19 /∗ s t a r t c a l l i n g the d e t e c t i on proce s s e s ∗/
20 Preproces s (&p ) ;
21
22 . . .
The code snippet above shows that the put_buffer routine is called by the function
ProcessPacket, which is in turn called by PcapProcessPacket, which we have seen in the
previous snippet. put_buffer is called after the packet has been decoded (the function
pointer dereferencing on line 7) and only if Snort is running in IDS mode.
The logic inside put_buffer is fairly simple: a copy of the data structure Packet used by
Snort to store information about a decoded packet is copied into the buﬀer performing
boundary checking.
The third and last hook into the Snort core is the most blurry and the least elegant one.
In the current setup, since we still do not have signatures written in order to support the
parallel rule matcher we had to rely on Snort signatures, and, therefore, we adapted them
to work in the parallel rule matcher environment.
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In section 6.3 we will explain more in details what we sketch here.
In our experiments we have adapted the detection plugins and made them parallel-aware. In
particular, we have enhanced a Snort preprocessor in order to process traﬃc and keep state
and, in addition, to communicate its state changes to other sensors with the possibility,
at the same time, to allow its state to be modiﬁed by communication coming from other
sensors. This means that the preprocessor cannot operate transparently, or at least not
thoroughly, but has to notify its state changes and being able to receive and perform
changes communicated by other. We tried to implement this logic in the least invasive way
possible.
Each time the preprocessor changes its state, it calls a notiﬁcation function provided by
the parallel API that we developed. This functions performs the operations described by
the sloppy rule matching algorithms, i.e., crafts a packet with the relevant information and
broadcasts it to other sensors (plus ancillary operations such as adding the match to the
pendingMatches queue).
The modiﬁcation of the plugin state as a result of the requests coming from other sensors, is
more diﬃcult to implement. As prescribed by the sloppy rule matching algorithm, a request
for state change is broadcasted from a sensor on the control network and every sensor needs
to perform the actions speciﬁed in order to change its state according to the information
received. The best way to implement this behavior would be to add a hook inside the plugin
to perform the state change, but this would have implied a lot of modiﬁcations inside the
plugin itself. For this reasons, we have implemented the functionality by luring the plugin
and passing a fake packet crafted in order to trigger the requested state change as it was
read from the capture interface.
This loosely speaking means that upon a match message is received by the control interface,
the system creates a packet ﬁlled with the relevant information and hands it out to the
relevant preprocessor, which is unaware from which interface the packet is coming.
The fake packet will then cause the relevant state changes to happen, but this would imply
that a new matching notiﬁcation is triggered by the plugin. In order to avoid this situation,
which would cause the sensors to continue mutually forwarding the same information in
a sort of resonance, when a sensor hands out a packet created from a message received
from the control interface it sets the global variable (skip_forward), which prevents the
packet from being communicated (forwarded) to other sensors.
We know that this implementation, which prescribes to craft a fake packet in order to
enforce the state changes in the plugin, is not optimized. We will draw a better way to
handle this situation in the future work.
The interconnection between Snort and the additional logic needed by the parallel rule
matching described above are summarized in Figure 5.1.
Features Implemented
After the general sketch of the architecture and an explanation of how the logic for the
parallel rule matcher is integrated with Snort, we now give a more precise description of
the most important implementation details.
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Figure 5.1: Logic interconnection between Snort and the parallel rule matching function-
alities. On the left is represented the standard Snort control ﬂow, while on the right is a
representation of the additional logic required by the parallel rule matcher to work. The
control is passed from Snort to the additional logic in four points (eight arrows cross the
dashed line, in both directions).
Let us start from the changes in the data structures used by Snort. We enhanced the
structure Packet, used by Snort to represent a decoded packet by adding some additional
ﬁelds.
1 typedef struct _RuleMatchInfo
2 {
3 int ru le_id ; // ru l e i d e n t i f i e r
4 uint32_t ack_host_bitset ;
5 /∗ b i t s e t o f hos t t h a t acknowledged the match : 0 means ' akc ' d ' or
6 ' no need to ack ' thus the semantic o f use f o r t h i s f i e l d i s :
7
8 −the i−th b i t correspondent to the i−th hos t i s s e t when a ru l e i s
9 matched to i n d i c a t e t h a t an acnowlegdement f o r hos t i i s needed
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10
11 −when and hos t acknowledge the ru l e / packe t pa i r the correspondent
12 b i t i s unset
13




18 // r u l e i d o f the match t ha t t r i g g e r e d the curren t one ;
19 int t r i gge r_ru l e_id ;
20
21 // packe t i d o f the match t ha t t r i g g e r e d the curren t one ;
22 unsigned int tr igger_packet_id ;
23
24 // sender id o f the match t ha t t r i g g e r e d the curren t one ;
25 unsigned int t r igger_sender_id ;
26 } RuleMatchInfo ;
27
28 typedef struct _Packet
29 {
30
31 . . .
32 RuleMatchInfo ∗ match_list ;
33 unsigned long int packet_id ;
34 unsigned int n_matches ;
35 unsigned int n_nacked_matches ; /∗ number o f matches t h a t need to be
36 acknowledged ∗/
37
38 . . .
39 } Packet ;
Every packet is enhanced with an array of structures RuleMatchInfo one for each rule that
was matched on that particular packet. The RuleMatchInfo structure maintains informa-
tion about a match, namely:
rule_id: the identiﬁcation of the rule that triggered the match
ack_host_bitset: a bitset that represent the sensors that acknowledged the match. Not
all the rules need explicit acknowledgements.
trigger_rule_id: the rule identiﬁer of the match that triggered the current one (if any).
trigger_packet_id: the packet identiﬁer of the match that triggered the current one (if
any).
trigger_sender_id: the sensor identiﬁer of the match that triggered the current one (if
any).
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The array of RuleMatchInfo is dynamically allocated the ﬁrst time that a packet matches.
This prevents wasting memory in a preallocated array that would not be used in the
majority of the cases (it is expected that the majority of the packets will not match any
rule).
Other auxiliary ﬁelds added to the Packet structure are:
packet_id: the packet id as assigned by the splitter.
n_matches: the number of rules that matched this packet.
n_nacked_matches: the number of rules that have not been acknowledged for this
particular packet.
Rules are numbered with increasing id and each rule is associated with some information,
that is:
1 typedef void (∗ t rans form_l i s t_t ) ( const Packet ∗ captured_packet ,
2 unsigned char∗∗ crafted_packet , int ∗ p_len ,
3 const uint16_t rule_code ) ;
4
5 typedef void (∗ update_state_l ist_t ) ( const unsigned char ∗ control_packet ,
6 const int p_len , const int rule_id , const uint32_t ,
7 const packet_id , const int sender_id ) ;
8
9 . . .
10 t rans form_l i s t_t sensor_trans fo rm_l i s t [MAX_TRANSFORM_LIST_LEN]= { . . . } ;
11 t rans form_l i s t_t contro l_node_transform_list [MAX_TRANSFORM_LIST_LEN]= { . . . } ;
12
13 update_state_l ist_t update_state_l i s t [MAX_UPDATE_LIST_LEN]= { . . . } ;
14
15 uint16_t control_node_rule_codes [MAX_TRANSFORM_LIST_LEN]= { . . . } ;
16 uint16_t sensor_rule_codes [MAX_TRANSFORM_LIST_LEN]= { . . . } ;
17
18 unsigned int need_match [MAX_TRANSFORM_LIST_LEN]= { . . . } ;
More precisely, each rule is described by three functions:
control_out: a function that transforms the matching packet into the information to be
broadcast to other sensors. This function is of type transform_list_t. The packet
returned by this function is ready to be sent once padded with the relevant Ethernet
source (the sensor's MAC address) and destination (the control node MAC address)
addresses. The array control_node_transform_list (line 11) is a list of function
pointers of the type speciﬁed above, one for each rule.
control_in: a function that reads a control packet that contains the matching infor-
mation for a certain rule and applies the transformation that the rule prescribes
to the sensor's state. This could be considered in some sense as the inverse of
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the countrol_out since the function countrol_out creates a control packet from a
change of state while this function operates a change of state in response to a control
packet.
This function is of type update_state_list_t(line 5), that is, a function that takes
as input an unsigned char * (the control packet) and some information about the
rule (sender_id: the id of the sensor that broadcasted the rule, rule_id: the id
of the rule that matched on the other sensor, and packet_id the id of the packet
that matched on the other sensor) and does not return anything but simply changes
the state of the sensor. The array update_state_list (line 13) is a list of function
pointers of the type speciﬁed above, one for each rule.
output: a function that transforms the matching packet into the information to be sent
to the control node. This function has type transform_list_t(line 1 in the snippet
above), that takes as input a Packet * (the packet that matched the rule) and
returns a new raw packet unsigned char * with the relevant information folded in.
The function takes another input parameter, that is, the rule id, needed to craft the
packet and give in output the length of the crafted packet too. The packet returned
by this function is ready to be sent, once padded with the relevant Ethernet source
(the sensor's MAC address) and destination (Ethernet broadcast) address. The array
sensor_transform_list (line 10) is a list of function pointers of the type speciﬁed
above, one for each rule.
In addition to the information above, some other ancillary information is associated to
each rule, that is:
1. A 2 byte code that has to be written on each packet broadcast to the other sensor.
The array sensor_rule_codes (line 16) contains this information for every rule.
2. A 2 byte code that has to be written on each packet sent to the control node. The
array control_node_rule_codes (line 15) contains this information for every rule.
3. a ﬂag that tells whether the rule needs to be acknowledged by other sensors or not.
The array need_ack (line 18) contains this information for every rule.
Control packets are sent/received through the packet socket interface [mp] set in non-
blocking mode. Packet sockets allow packets to be passed to and from the device driver
without any changes in the packet data. When transmitting a packet, the user supplied
buﬀer should contain the physical layer header. For this reason we deﬁned a format for
packets that are exchanged between sensors and from sensors to the control node.
In Figure 5.4.2 is shown the format of the three types of packet exchanged among sensors
and sent by the sensors to the control node. It has to be noticed that the protocol type
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(a) Match packet format (b) MatchAck packet format (c) Earliest needed packet for-
mat
Control packets are standard Ethernet packets with a custom ethertype address at bytes
12-14 that identiﬁes the type of information that the packet carries. More precisely,
• Match control packets have a 2 byte rule code encoded at bytes 14-15, followed by
speciﬁc rule parameters.
• MatchAck control packets have the value of the matched packed id encoded in bytes
16-19.
• earliestNeeded packets have the value of earliestNeeded encoded in bytes 14-17.
It has to be noticed that packets that could result having a length smaller than the mini-
mum required by the Ethernet standard (64 bytes) have to be padded.
Putting It All Together
Now we put all the previous consideration together by following step by step the data ﬂow
of a traﬃc packet through the parallel rule matcher.
As explained before, once a packet is captured from the traﬃc, it is decoded by the Snort
decode engine and then put in the sensor INMB. The function in charge of doing this is
put_buffer, which inserts the packet in a circular buﬀer, ordered by PacketId.
After this step, the packet is passed again to Snort, which check it against its preprocessors.
If the packet matches a rule on a preprocessor parallel-enabled then the preprocessor itself
will call the notiﬁcation function notify_change passing the id or the rule that matched.
The notify_change function knows implicitly that the packet that matched the rule is
the last packet inserted in the buﬀer (we record into a variable the last id inserted) and
subsequently does two operations: it modiﬁes the pendingMatches queue and it broadcasts
the information regarding the match, as the bully algorithm prescribes.
It has to be noticed that in our implementation there is not any data structure that rep-
resents the pending matches. The pendingMatches queue is implicit, and the information
about matches is stored in the relevant Packet structure of the matching packets that are
in the INMB. Since the INMB is ordered by PacketId and that all the packets matching at
least one rule have to be in the INMB (the sloppy algorithm prescribes this), this way of
storing information about matches is identical to the one that an explicit pendingMatches
queue would provide.
The function that should update the pendingMatches queue then simply adds a new
RuleMatchInfo to the matching packet in the sensor INMB.
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After that, a packet is crafted to store the information about the match in the way described
above and then it is broadcast to other sensors.
The captured packet then continues its journey through the Snort preprocessors and de-
tection engine.
In addition to the mechanism described above, every time a new packet is received an event
timer (i.e., an event counter that ﬁres some action periodically) is updated. The events
associated with the event counter are related to the management of the earliestNeeded
and INMB synchronization, more precisely:
• If the sensor is the current holder of the minimum earliestNeeded (elected through
the bully algorithm) then it broadcasts its earliestNeeded every time a deﬁned event-
time expires (50 packets received, in our setup). Sensors broadcast their earliestNeeded
by crafting and sending a single Ethernet frame with a custom ethertype and the
earliestNeeded value padded just right after the header (see Figure 5.4.2).
• For each sensor, if a given event-time is expired since the last change seen in the ad-
vertised earliestNeeded operated by other sensors (or itself) then the earliestNeeded
seen is considered stable (i.e., becomes the discardPtr) and packets earlier than it in
the INMB are discarded. Before being discarded, each packet that matched at least
one rule is encoded and sent to the control node.
When a packet is received on the control interface its ethertype is checked, this can have
3 diﬀerent values:
• If (ethertype=CODE_MIN_BROADCAST) then the received control packet carries
the earliestNeeded sent by some sensor. In this case, the bully algorithm comes
to play and if the receiving sensor has a lower earliestNeeded, then that value is
broadcast back, otherwise, the value is stored. If after a suitable time this value
remains stable, it will be considered the new discardPtr and used to prune the INMB
buﬀer. While pruning the INMB, each packet that should be discarded is checked for
rules that matched it. For each rule found, a message is sent to the control node to
signal that the match occurred. In this situation, the control_node_transform_list
array comes to play. A new raw packet is created using the function associated with
the matched rule that extracts the relevant information about the match from the
packet and sends them, crafted in a new raw Ethernet frame, to the control node.
• If (ethertype=MATCH_ETHERTYPE) then a match notiﬁcation is received and
the correspondent changes to the state are performed. Those changes do not have to
trigger a new notiﬁcation to the other sensors. If the packet id associated with the
match is earlier than lastInspected then the INMB buﬀer is scanned after having
updated the state and any new match caused is broadcast. Packets that have already
matched a determined rule are prevented to match the same rule again. If no new
packets have matched then a MatchAck packet is sent back in unicast to the sensor
that broadcasted the match.
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• If (ethertype=MATCH_ACK_ETHERTYPE) then an acknowledgement to a match
is being received. The sensor searches for the packet id whose match is being acknowl-
edged, and, for that packet, the RuleMatchInfo with the correspondent rule id is
searched. When the correct RuleMatchInfo entry is found, its ﬁeld ack_host_bitset
is updated with the id of the sensor that acknowledged the match. If all the sensors
have acknowledged the match an acknowledgement is sent to the sensor that caused
the match that triggered the current match to occur.
From the point of view of the communication among the sensors, it has to be noticed that:
• earliestNeeded and Match control packets are sent to Ethernet broadcast address
and have as a source address the MAC address of the sensors that sent them.
• MatchAck packets are sent in unicast to the sensor that broadcast the match only
and have as Ethernet source address the MAC (Media Access Control) of the ac-
knowledging sensor.
We have given a precise characterization of how the sloppy rule matching algorithm has
been implemented for the sensor nodes. In the next section, the logic of the control node
will be taken into consideration.
5.4.3 Control Node
The logic implemented in the control node is rather simpler compared with the one taken
into consideration for the sensors.
As for the sensors, the control node is based on Snort, in order to share the debug func-
tionalities and the sensor identity management with the sensors' codebase, but actually it
exploits a negligible part of Snort itself.
Loosely speaking, the control node can be seen as a sensor that does not capture traﬃc
and works only by processing packets received on the control interface.
The control interface receives packets through a packet socket set in blocking mode (we do
not need the non-blocking mode here, since there are no concurrent captures on multiple
interfaces to be performed).
The control node must process the packets ordered by packet id, and, since packets can
arrive out of order to the control node because they followed diﬀerent paths through the
sensors, the control node needs to reorder the packets upon receiving them and before
processing them.
This task is accomplished using a hybrid event-timeout/real-timeout based mechanism.
For each packet, we assume that no other packets with a smaller packet id can arrive after
a certain event-span 4 (currently 100 packets). This means that we use a queue in which
we store the last 100 valid packet received sorted by packet id. Every time a new packet
4as for the sensors, we measure the time as number of event occurred, in this case number of packet
received
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is received, it is inserted into the queue and if the queue size becomes greater than 100
then the oldest packet is removed from the queue and processed. If a received packet is
older than the oldest one it is declared not valid and discarded. Therefore, each received
packet is passed to the sensors with a delay of 100 packets. This could be too slow in case
of signatures that do not match often and could cause a reaction lag of the system over
acceptable limits. In order to avoid this, a pure timeout system enforce the depletion of





The development and the earlier tests of the parallel rule matcher have been performed in
an emulated environment.
As stated in Chapter 5, this environment was designed to mimic a real network deployment
in a transparent way. Neither the sensors nor the control node processes should be aware of
being run in an emulated network environment. In this way, once tested in a user-friendly
manner in the emulated environment, the system can be transposed into a real network
without changing its conﬁguration.
The emulated testbed was useful during development and debug sessions since it is self-
contained and a single laptop can seamlessly emulate a system with thousands of sensors.
Of course, the emulated system does not help study the performance and scaling properties
of the model since emulated processes, hubs and switches do not work in real concurrence.
Therefore, time measures are not relevant.
In order to have relevant measurements with respect to time and performance on an em-
ulated system we should have introduced a virtualized time notion to take into account
the fact that concurrence in the emulated system is not real, but, instead it is emulated
by multiprocessing/multithreading. In such a system, the time as perceived by the single
processes has not anything to do with the real time so direct time measurements on the
emulated system are meaningless from the performance point of view. Adding the concept
of a virtualized time would have turned our emulation into a simulation and would have
made things harder to implement. One of the greatest issues with time virtualization would
have been the estimation of the time spent in active network components, such as hubs
and switches, which would have implied having a mathematical model for those. Such kind
of simulation problems are an open research ﬁeld and implementing a model from scratch
for our environment, only for testing purposes, would have been overkill.
Following the above considerations, we have chosen to use the emulated environment only
for debug and consistency checking, while we take into consideration a real-network de-
ployment to perform measurements regarding performance and scaling properties.
70
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6.1.1 Network Virtualization
There are diﬀerent tools, available in the open-source community to build emulated network
environments. Research on network virtualization has recently become more and more
important, fostered by the wide development of machine-virtualization techniques, such
as Xen [Bar03, MST+05] and Qemu [Bar06], and the increasing development of userland
networking techniques (e.g., OpenVPN [Fei06]).
Although many network virtualization techniques are available on the market and in the
open source community for the aforementioned reasons, it has been diﬃcult to ﬁnd a
solution suitable for our needs, because of various reasons.
Almost all virtualization systems are designed and tweaked towards layer III networking
(e.g., IP) and above, while our system is Ethernet-based. This is for instance the case of
the python twisted framework [Kin05], which is a powerful networking engine written in
Python, supporting numerous protocols but designed mainly for application-level protocols.
Twisted includes some tools for raw level II networking (see the plugin formerly called
twisted-pair) but this part is not actively developed anymore.
In addition to that, we were looking for a system that would be easily-customizable in order
to emulate communication failures, slow downs, etc. This has excluded solutions such as
OpenVPN [Fei06], which is a full-featured SSL VPN solution that can accommodate a
wide range of conﬁgurations, but is a well-established large project, which would be too
complicated to customize.
As a last constraint, we wanted a system easy to setup and install, with a small memory
footprint, and low CPU utilization. This requirement of course avoids the utilization of
any full-blown OS virtualization systems, such as UML (User Mode Linux) [Dik06], or
over-featured virtual network infrastructure such as VINI [BFH+06].
Instead, we found very interesting for our needs a small (less than 10K lines) C toolkit called
VDE (Virtual Distributed Ethernet). Before describing the toolkit and the enhancements
we have implemented, we ﬁrst draw some consideration of what the fundamental parts of
an emulated network are.
6.2 Emulated Network Topology
In brief, a network is made of nodes and links, so we need to emulate both these elements
in our virtual network framework. In our setup the nodes are the network interfaces from
which traﬃc packets and control packets are captured while the links are connections of
two types:
• one-to-one connections between two interfaces,
• one-to-many connections that pass through an active network component, such as a
hub or a switch.
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TUN/TAP Device
In order to emulate network interfaces we used the TUN/TAP device driver available for
Linux>=2.2. In particular, we used the TAP Ethernet network device. An excerpt of the
TUN/TAP device driver documentation follows.
TAP driver was designed as low-level kernel support for Ethernet tunneling. It
provides to userland applications two interfaces:
/dev/net/tun: a character device;
tapX: a virtual Ethernet interface.
Userland applications can write Ethernet frames to /dev/net/tun and the
kernel will receive this frame from tapX interface. At the same time, every
frame that the kernel writes to the tapX interface can be read by userland
application from the /dev/net/tun device.
Using the TAP devices we can have up to 255 interfaces on a single machine. Those
interfaces are similar to real Ethernet interfaces and we can read from them using packet
sockets or capture raw Ethernet frames by means of libpcap.
Intuitively, TAP devices are a good ﬁt for emulated network interfaces and we made sensors
and the control node read from those interface. Now it remains to implement in the vir-
tual framework the link abstraction. This has been achieved using the Virtual Distributed
Ethernet.
Virtual Distributed Ethernet
VDE is a software component developed by Prof. Renzo Davoli (University of Bologna).
Using the author's words [Dav04]:
VDE is a kind of Swiss knife of emulated networks. It can be used as a general
Virtual Private network as well as a mobility support technology, a tool for net-
work testing, a general reconﬁgurable overlay network, a layer for implementing
privacy preserving technologies and many others.
Among the advantages of VDE, we have that it is designed following the KISS principle
verbatim. It is a collection of simple and modular utilities implemented in a clear and
stripped down -yet fully functional- way. It has been very easy to modify VDE source code
in order to introduce our enhancements.
The main components of VDE are described below.
vde_switch is a component that mimics the behavior of a physical Ethernet switch. It
has several ports that can be connected with Ethernet-compliant equipment, and,
therefore, with a TAP interface.
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vde_cable is the virtual counterpart of an Ethernet cable and can be used to connect
together two vde_switches.
It is easy to see that vde_switch ﬁts perfectly the role of a virtualized network link, and,
as a matter of fact, we used it to connect the virtual interfaces to each other.
More precisely, we deployed a virtual network architecture where each sensor reads control
packets and capture traﬃc from two TAP interfaces and the control node receives packets
from a TAP interface.
All the control interfaces have been connected to each other with a vde_switch and the traf-
ﬁc is sent from the splitter to the sensors' capture interfaces through another vde_switch.
Enhancements to VDE
As described in Chapter 4, in our setup packets are obtained from a tap (T) into the high-
speed network link(s). The tap copies the packets and sends them to a packet numbering
unit (PNU), which in turns, forwards them to the splitter. The splitter sends the traﬃc to
the sensor nodes in charge of performing the detection operations.
In order to perform the round robin distribution (or any other form of distribution) of the
traﬃc we used a combination of an Ethernet frame rewriter and a switch.
The frame routing to the sensors is accomplished by rewriting the frames Ethernet desti-
nation address with the MAC address of the sensor that should take care of its analysis
and then by sending them to an opportunely conﬁgured switch. For instance, given that
mac_array is an array that contains the sensors' capture interface MAC addresses and N
is the number of sensors deployed, by rewriting the i-th frame destination address with the
value of mac_array[i%N ] one can partition the traﬃc in a round-robin fashion.
The Ethernet frame rewriter mechanism can be incorporated in the packet numbering unit,
which modiﬁes the Ethernet header as well. As a matter of fact, the packet numbering unit
tag frames with an increasing number but cannot add an additional ﬁeld to the packets in
order not to incur into fragmentation for packets that have size close to the link MTU.
In summary, by using a frame rewriter and a switch we can perform the packet splitting
as described in Chapter 4.
The traﬃc-distributer switch has to be conﬁgured with static routes. The switch needs to
know in advance the Ethernet MAC addresses of the sensors capture interfaces and does
not need any auto-learning mechanism because packets ﬂow only in one direction (i.e., from
the splitter to the sensors). Indeed, an auto-learning mechanism would be harmful because
the frame Ethernet source address does not represent a real MAC address (it has been
rewritten by the PNU), and, therefore, the switch would spend time and resources in order
to remember the supposed-to-be sources addresses, resulting in a performance decrease.
Since version of VDE that we used (vde2-2.1.1) does not implement static routes for the
vde_switch tool, we implemented this feature.
More precisely, a new command line option (static_route) has been added to vde_switch
in order to set the software switch in static route mode.
Second, the logic to acquire theMAC addresses and to use them to forward frames has been
added. Since vde_switch, when connecting to TAP interfaces, needs to know the name of
CHAPTER 6. SYSTEM EVALUATION 74
the interfaces it connects to, we exploited this knowledge in order to have it retrieving the
MAC address of the interfaces automatically.
In details, we modiﬁed the function open_tap, whose task is to open the /dev/net/tun
device and to associate it to an interface speciﬁed in the command line, in order to also
retrieve the interface MAC address. The code snippet below show how this is done.
1 int open_tap (char ∗dev , unsigned char ∗ mac)
2 {
3 struct i f r e q i f r ;
4 int fd , s ;
5
6 . . .
7 i f ( ( s = socket (AF_INET,
8 SOCK_RAW, htons (ETH_P_ALL) ) ) < 0)
9 {




14 memset(& i f r , 0 , s izeof ( i f r ) ) ;
15 s t rncpy ( i f r . ifr_name , dev , s izeof ( i f r . ifr_name ) − 1 ) ;
16 i f ( i o c t l ( s , SIOCGIFHWADDR, &i f r ) == −1) {
17 p r i n t l o g (LOG_ERR, "SIOCGIFHWADDR f a i l e d %s" ,
18 s t r e r r o r ( er rno ) ) ;
19 return (−1);
20 }
21 c l o s e ( s ) ;
22
23 memcpy(mac,& i f r . ifr_hwaddr . sa_data ,ETH_HEADER_SIZE) ;
24 . . .
The function prototype has been modiﬁed in order to take an additional output parameter:
the MAC address of the tap interface opened. The logic in charge of retrieving the interface
MAC address is in lines 7-21.
After the retrieval, a simple linked list is created with all the MAC addresses of the TAP
interfaces, and, upon packet forwarding, if the vde_switch is working in static_route
mode, the list is scanned to ﬁnd the port to which the incoming frame has to be forwarded
according to its Ethernet destination address.
We are aware that a liner search on a linked list is not very eﬃcient and that a hash table
would perform better but since we are operating with a number of sensor lesser than 10
the cost of a linear search is totally aﬀordable.
Aside from the logic to handle the list of MAC address, the only modiﬁcation that re-
mained to be performed on the vde_switch source code was to change the logic in packet
forwarding when static_route mode is set.
In details, the switch memory update (performed by calling the find_in_hash function)
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has to be avoided if static_route mode is on (see the additional disjunction in the if
condition at line 2):
1 i f ( ! ( ( IS_BROADCAST( packet−>header . s r c ) ) | | ( p f l a g & HUB_TAG)
2 | | s t a t i c_route ) )
3 {
4
5 int l a s t = find_in_hash_update ( packet−>header . src , vlan , port ) ;
6 . . .
The find_in_hash function, whose task is to ﬁnd the port to which forward frames when
the switch works in dynamic mode, has been modiﬁed in order to search in the static route
list, instead of the address-port hash table, if the switch is working in static_route mode.
The code that performs that in the snippet below is the condition at line 4 that forces the
lookup in the static route list if the relevant ﬂag is set.
1 int find_in_hash (unsigned char ∗dst , int vlan )
2 {
3 int p ;
4 i f ( ! s t a t i c_route | | (p=lookup_stat ic_route ( dst ))<0 )
5 {
6 struct hash_entry ∗e = f ind_entry ( extmac ( edst , dst , v lan ) ) ;
7 i f ( e == NULL) return −1;
8 return ( e−>port ) ;
9 }
10 else
11 return p ;
12 }
Thanks to the simplicity and ﬂexibility of the VDE codebase it has been easy to patch it
in order to add the aforementioned functionalities.
6.2.1 Python Automatic Test Framework
We setup a couple of Python scripts that could help creating a development testbed for
the parallel rule matcher deployed in the virtual network framework.
We now describe the functionalities of those scripts without entering in the implementation
details.
The ﬁrst script creates the virtual network testbed, resembling the infrastructure deﬁned
in Chapter 4 and 5. It is basically driven by a single parameter: the number of sensors to
be created, say N . The script creates 2N + 2 TAP interfaces (tapi . . . tapi+2N+2, where
i is the ﬁrst identiﬁer available) and two vde_switch. Optionally, it is possible to assign
a speciﬁc address to the TAP interfaces. If not provided, MAC addresses will be assigned
to the virtual interfaces in increasing order starting from 00:00:00:00:00:01. The two
vde_switches created by the script mimic the functionalities of the distribution switch
and of the control switch. The distribution switch is started in daemon mode, with static
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routes and connects together interfaces tapi and tapi+1, tapi+3 . . . tapi+2N−1, while the con-
trol switch, started in daemon mode and with static routes as well, connects together
interfaces tapi+2, tapi+4 . . . tapi+2N and tapi+2N+1. Interface tapi is used by the splitter to
inject frames, interface tapi+2N+1 is the control interface of the control node, and other
interfaces arex the capture and control interfaces of the sensors, as described in Figure 6.1
Figure 6.1: Virtual topology for the rule matcher, as created by the helper scripts.
In addition, the script logs operation to console, performs clean exit on errors, and save
its working state (i.e., vde_switch daemons' PID, interfaces names, etc. ) along with a
description of the network topology created, to a conﬁguration ﬁle. This make it possible
for the script to stop the testbed by killing the vde_switch daemons and to delete the tap
interfaces previously created. The script is designed in such a way that it is possible to run
concurrently more than one testbed on the same host (provided that the total number of
TAP interfaces created is less than 255).
Another script is used to eﬀectively start the Snort sensors and control node concurrently
attaching them to the virtual topology previously created. This script reads the network
topology description created by the previous script and actually runs the sensors and
the control node by passing the right parameters (in terms of which interfaces to reads
or capture from) to the Snort processes. By means of the select primitive, this script
multiplexes output and errors logged by all the nodes into a single stream of logs, making
it possible to debug the concurrent system as it was a serial one. In addition, the script can
run all the Snort processes into valgrind (extremely useful when debugging and chasing
memory leaks).
Both the scripts described helped ease a lot the development processes.
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Testing the System
To test whether the system was functioning properly during development we used the afore-
mentioned scripts in conjunction with two powerful tools: scapy [bio] and tcpdump [MLJ02,
tcp02].
tcpdump is a well-known and widely-used tool for network monitoring and data acquisi-
tion. tcpdump uses libpcap to capture traﬃc. The traﬃc of interest can be speciﬁed by
command line arguments. tcpdump has been very useful in the development of the parallel
rule matcher to understand which packets were arriving or departing from an interface.
tcpdump's powerful ﬁlter capabilities were useful for instance to select only packets coming
from a given address, or class of address, in order to have a partial view of the system.
The other extremely important tool used during development and testing is scapy, a tool
by Philippe Biondi. To use the words on the scapy website:
Scapy is a powerful interactive packet manipulation program. It is able to forge
or decode packets of a wide number of protocols, send them on the wire, capture
them, match requests and replies, and much more
A strong good point in favor of scapy is that it is implemented in Python and comes
with an interactive shell that resembles the default Python shell. In this way it is very
straightforward to forge packets of any kind using a simple and intuitive syntax. We mainly
used scapy to inject raw Ethernet frames into the various interfaces and see what the results
were. For instance, with this simple command:
for i in [ 1 , 3 , 5 , 7 ] :
sendp ( Ether ( dst='AA:BB:CC:DD:EE:0%d '%i , s r c=' aa : 0 0 : 0 0 : 0 0 : 0 0 : 0%d '%i ) ,
i f a c e=' tap0 ' )
four Ethernet frames are forged and sent to four diﬀerent MAC addresses. Without scapy,
the same functionalities could have been implemented in C using the libnet [Foo] library
in a far more complex way.
6.3 Real-world Network Setup
As we said in Section 6.1, the emulated network testbed was developed mainly for testing
and debugging purposes, and not for a thorough performance analysis. In order to have such
an experimental veriﬁcation, we setup a real-world network testbed. From the networking
point of view, the system has been built following verbatim the architecture described
in Chapter 4 and already implemented in the emulated environment. More precisely the
system was composed of two networks:
1. the distribution network, through which packets are sent from the splitter to the
sensors. This is an Ethernet networks with no IP (Internet Protocol) stack level. The
splitter has a high throughput network interface connected to a switch conﬁgured
with static routes from the interface to which the splitter is connected towards the
outgoing sensors interfaces.
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2. The control network, through which the sensors exchange control packets with each
other and with the control node. Sensors and the control node are connected through
a hub since we do not have any high throughput requirements for control traﬃc, only
a low latency is desirable.
Port Scan Specialization
From the software point of view, we installed a stripped down -yet representative- version
of the algorithm described in Chapter 5.
On the sensors' side, Snort listens on the traﬃc interface. The Snort running on the
sensors have two parallel-enabled preprocessors loaded, namely: stream4_reassemble and
sfportscan, conﬁgured as below:
preprocessor stream4_reassemble






These two preprocessors have been modiﬁed in order to support some of the features
described in Chapter 5. We analyzed their behavior by following the journey of a packet
captured from a live interface.
1. When a new packet is captured on the live interface it is passed to the Snort decoding
engine.
2. Before sending the packet to the preprocessor (stream4_reassemble and sfportscan)
each sensor listens (in non-blocking mode) for incoming packets on the control inter-
face and process them, if any.
3. Packets received from the live interface are sent to the stream4_reassemble. If the
packet changes a state of the reassembly machine (i.e., initiates, tears down, or mod-
iﬁes the state of some connections), which in this example incarnates the scanning
state described in our theoretical framework described in Chapter 4, then it is broad-
cast to the other sensors as a Match beacon.
4. Packets received from the control interface (coming from other sensors) are injected
into the stream reassembly preprocessor in order to re-create the same state changes
and then discarded.
5. Packets sent through the stream reassembly preprocessor are then handed out to the
port scan preprocessor. At the beginning of the process, some tests are performed
on the packet in order to exclude benign packets (test for necessary conditions for
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attack). One of this tests consists in checking if the packet is part of a legitimate
connection. If this is the case, the packet surely cannot be part of a scan and thus
no further check is performed on it.
Here is where the scanning state of the stream4_reassemble preprocessor is ex-
ploited. Packets that are not tagged as benign at this stage do not go through a
complete analysis against port scan detection heuristics but are simply forwarded to
the control node that takes care of them. Sensors do not maintain any state associated
with the port scan plugin, such as scanner and scanned lists.
6. The control node has only the sfportscan preprocessor loaded and does nothing
more than letting the packets received from sensors going thoroughly through it.
Control node does not know anything about the preprocessing steps carried on at
the sensor level and uses the port scan preprocessor thoroughly, maintaining the state
associated to it.
It is easy to recognize that the aforementioned setup is a particular case of the general
architectural model described in Chapter 4. The preprocessor stream4_reassembly on the
sensors keeps the predicate state, while the sfportscan plugin performs the rule predicate
evaluation based on that. The working state is only kept in the control node sfportscan
preprocessor in the form of all the relevant structures maintained by the plugin itself, such
as scanner hosts and scanned hosts lists.
Note here that this experimental setup is a very stripped-down, yet working, incarnation
of the theoretical framework proposed, and, in particular:
• There is only one signature (port scan) that is checked; the stream4_reassemble
preprocessor does not check the traﬃc against any signature but only keeps the
state, but from the modeling point of view and the subsequent analysis, we consider
them both as rules, but with diﬀerent side eﬀects.
• The semantic of the inter-node communication is the same proposed in algorithm
4 but the syntax is slightly simpliﬁed. In particular, transformation functions as
described in Chapter 5 have singular values, which can be seen in Table 6.3.
control_out control_in output
stream reassemble rule identity identity null
port scan rule null null identity
The identity function takes a packet as input and returns the same packet in output,
while the null function takes a packet as input and returns the null string ξ in
output. The stream reassembly rule broadcasts state changes to other sensors by
simply forwarding to broadcast Ethernet address the packets that have matched;
in this sense, the function applied to packets before being broadcast is the identity
function. In the same fashion, sensors process the control packets forwarded by other
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sensors by simply handing them through their instance of the stream4_reassembly
preprocessors with no changes, that is, they evaluate an identity function on those
packets.
Packets that cause a stream4_reassembly change are not sent to the control node,
thus formally we can say that the output function for that rule is null. In the same
fashion, since portscan rule is no more than a predicate evaluation, it does not cause
packets to be broadcast to other sensors (null control_out and control_in functions)
and forwards matching packets to the control node unchanged (identity output func-
tion)
• There is no matchAck for the match messages, or said it in other words, rules have
the ﬂag need_ack set to oﬀ.
• There is no INMB on the sensors. Since packets that can update the stream reassem-
bly machine usually belong to the TCP three-way handshake, those are supposed to
be to usually fairly distant in time from each other, compared to the times involved
in the communications among the sensors. This simply means that we assume that
the state-changing packets are processed by the sensors in the right order, as they
would be processed by a serial machine, and, if this assumption holds, there is no
need for the INMB. More formally, we can say that even thought the packet stream
can undergone a local reordering in being concurrently processed by sensors, the
subsequence of the state-changing packets comes to the sensors in order. We will see
later on this chapter that this assumption does not hold under certain conditions.
The above considerations show that the evaluated module is an instance of the general one
proposed in Chapter 4 and implemented in Chapter 5.
Evaluation Dataset
In order to evaluate the system, we have crafted an artiﬁcial dataset by merging the
standard evaluation dataset IDEVAL[Lab98, Lab99, LFG+00, McH00] (attack free) with
a dump of a port scan performed against a host inside the home network.
The port scan has been performed by the tool nmap (see Chapter 3) against the host
X.Y.Z.W issuing the following command:
nmap -p20-25,80,443 X.Y.Z.W
The IDEVAL dataset used was attack-free and composed by 1.37M packets of various
protocols. It has been merged with the port scan dump by means of a modiﬁed version of
tcpmerge [Bev].
tcpmerge merges two libpcap traces with respect to time. The two traces we merged are
not time related and port scan dump would have been appended in queue to the IDEVAL
traﬃc, since recorded years later (IDEVAL traﬃc used was recorded in 1999). In order to
avoid this, we have modiﬁed the tcpmerge tool to make it merge traces regardless the
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time and distributing the attack packets evenly over the attack-free traﬃc. This resulted
in having approximately one attack packet every 65K attack-free packets.
As a last artifact modiﬁcation of the traﬃc packets, we rewrote the MAC address of every
frame in order to induct diﬀerent scattering pattern on the splitter. More precisely, we
created two testsets with diﬀerent characteristics:
1. Ethernet frame destination addresses of the traﬃc image have been rewritten in order
to cause the distribution switch to send the packet round-robin to sensors. This has
been accomplished by setting the destination address of the i-th frame as mac[i%N ]
where mac[·] is a list of the Ethernet MAC address of the sensors' capture interfaces
and N is the number of the sensors.
2. Frame destination addresses have been rewritten according to a hash calculated on
the TCP source and destination port and IP source and destination address. More
precisely, the destination address of the i-th frame has been set to mac[hash(Pi)%N ]
where Pi are the aforementioned parameters for the the i-th frame and hash(·) is a
hash function that returns integer numbers as a result.
The MAC rewriting operations have been accomplished by the tcprewrite [Turb] tool.
tcprewrite is a tool to rewrite packets stored in pcap ﬁle format and provides many ways
to modify diﬀerent packets ﬁelds. We modiﬁed tcprewrite in order to rewrite Ethernet
destination address in the manner described above.
More precisely, we added a function that take as input packets as read by tcprewrite and
returns in output an integer hash [Wan07] of the sum of the TCP source and destination
ports and the IP source and destination addresses 1.
The program has been also enhanced with a new command line option to specify a ﬁle
that holds a list of newline-separated MAC addresses, which are the sensors' MAC ad-
dresses. Additional logic has been put into work in order to actually write to the frames
the addresses read according to the functions described above.
It has to be noticed that the aforementioned task could have been carried out using the
by far more user-friendly scapy at almost no cost. Unfortunately the version (1.0.4.1beta)
available at the time of the experiments had problems in reading the IDEVAL traces (bug
in the NTP packets decoding).
6.3.1 Hardware
We set up four Linux boxes sensors running Snort 2.6 [Roe99] with the aforementioned
preprocessors loaded in.
The function of the control node has been accomplished by another Linux box running a
patched Snort with a vanilla version of the sfportscan preprocessor.
1We applied a hash function to scramble the bits of the aforementioned sum, which, taken as is and
applied to the packets of the IDEVAL, resulted being strongly biased towards odd numbers (65% of the
processed packets resulted in having an odd sum).
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Another Linux box was used to send the traﬃc into the testbed through a SysKonnect
SK-98xx Gigabit Ethernet network card connected to a 32-bit/66MHz PCI bus.
Each sensor box mounts two 3Com network cards, one to receive the traﬃc from the splitter
and another one to communicate with other sensor and the control node, mimicking closely
the virtual topology reported in Figure 6.1
Sensors are connected to the splitter box through a Cisco Catalyst 3500 XL switch con-
ﬁgured with static routes to the sensors capture interfaces. The switch has a 1000-BaseT
GBIC module that receive the traﬃc from the splitter output interface and is connected
to sensors through FastEthernet ports.
The sensors control interfaces are connected to each other through an ordinary FastEth-
ernet hub. Since we do not need high performance on the control networks but only low
latency and, given that the traﬃc on that network should be fairly low, we can avoid using
a switch in favor of a hub.
Splitter
Some words have to be spent about the splitter and the way we injected packets into the
parallel rule matcher.
The traﬃc source activity has been emulated through tcpreplay [Tura], which was run on
the splitter box to replay the traﬃc datasets through the Gigabit Ethernet output interface
at a conﬁgurable rate. Note that the whole traﬃc dataset needs to be load into memory
before being replayed2 in order to avoid the communication between disk and memory,
which could represent a speed bottleneck3. Even though we took into consideration this
issue, in the following experiments the maximum throughput used will never be higher
than 50Mb/s, since it was already suﬃcient to conﬁrm our claims.
6.4 Experiments and Preliminary Results
We ran a simple experiment to validate the model. Even though the results are very promis-
ing, more testing is needed in the future to evaluate the system in diﬀerent conﬁgurations.
We compared the parallel rule matcher setup with a single instance of a vanilla Snort
with the stream4_reassemble and sfportscan plugin loaded, patched and conﬁgured as
explained in the previous sections. We expected that at a given traﬃc rate the single Snort
would not be able to keep up with the traﬃc and thus would miss the port scan attack,
while the parallel version of the sensor should still be able to catch it. We performed also
other tests in order to evaluate the goodness of our ﬁndings against a control test set. A
list of the test performed follows.
2In Linux this task can be accomplished transparently by copying the image traﬃc ﬁle into /dev/shm/
and reading it from there. /dev/shm is a tempfs ﬁlesystem that lives in RAM. It has to be noticed that its
maximum size has to be set consistently with the data that are copied into it.
3Disk performance is often the primary bottleneck to network performance. Disk bandwidth for ordinary
SATA or EIDE disk is around 50 MB/s while a Gigabit Ethernet is in theory capable of ≈ 120 MB/s
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single Snort: in this setup, the traﬃc has been replayed to a single box mounting a
Gigabit Ethernet interface via a cross cable, ﬁrst at low rate and then at a speed
higher enough to cause packet losses.
parallel architecture with a single sensor: in this setup, the traﬃc has been replayed
to a single-sensor parallel machine equipped with the aforementioned preprocessors.
This deployment has been performed for testing purposes only. We aimed at testing
the system eliminating concurrence issues among sensors while retaining the two-tier
architecture layout.
In this case, as before, traﬃc has been replayed ﬁrst at low rate and then at a higher
speed to cause packet losses.
parallel architecture with four sensors: in this setup, we implemented the full-blown
parallel architecture. This conﬁguration has been tested in several ways, namely both
with traﬃc sliced according to a hash calculated on the TCP/IP headers and simple
round-robin, and both with low and high rate traﬃc.
We found that when traﬃc is replied at a low rate, all the tested conﬁgurations give the
same output, that is, they successfully identify the port scan introduced into the data,
regardless of the fact that if the traﬃc splitter was working in a round-robin or hash-based
fashion.
It has to be noticed that other attacks have been identiﬁed, which have to be considered
as false positives, since the traﬃc utilized should be attack free. With traﬃc replied at a
lower rate the false positives identiﬁed are still the same. This gives us a strong hint that,
regardless the topology and the setup, under light load, the systems behave in the same
way.
When increasing the rate of replayed traﬃc, in the parallel setup with only one sensor 6.4,
the sensor approximately forwards to the control node the 10% of the total packet count
(148Kpackets) because recognized as possibly dangerous, before starting missing packets.
Recalling Equation 4.11, this would mean a degree of exploitable speedup of order 10, in the
assumption that we have sensor and control node installed on the same kind of hardware
(α=1, as expressed in Chapter 4).
Unfortunately, the set up with four sensors, i.e., the one that resemble more closely a real
world incarnation of the system, does not show the same scaling properties when tested
with the round-robin traﬃc.
As the traﬃc rate increases, each sensor forwards an increasing fraction of the received
packets reaching 1/2 of the received traﬃc at a rate of 50Mb/s. Even though the sen-
sors nodes do not get congested, since each of them receive 1/4 of the total throughput,
the control node ends up processing an aggregate throughput of 1/2 of the one outgoing
from the splitter. In this is situation, the control node becomes the real bottleneck of the
architecture.
It is remarkable to understand that the performance decrease of the parallel engine are
associated with a decrease of communication eﬃciency between the sensors, which occurs
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Low speed traﬃc High speed traﬃc
(≈ 100Kb/s) (≈ 50Mb/s)
Single Snort instance port scan detected port scan missed
Parallel architecture: 1 sensor port scan detected port scan missed
Parallel architecture: 4 sensors port scan detected port scan missed
round-robin traﬃc
Parallel architecture: 4 sensors port scan detected port scan detected
hashed traﬃc
Table 6.1: System evaluation results. It can be see that the only conﬁguration able to keep
up with 50Mb/s paced traﬃc is the parallel one, with four nodes (in bold).
when the traﬃc rate increases. This hypothesis has been conﬁrmed by the fact that the
experiment where the hash-based splitting was employed with the full-blown architecture
went well, producing more or less the same performance of the single node Snort, that is,
1/10th of the traﬃc forwarded from each sensors to the control node, which therefore ﬁnds
itself processing 1/10th of the total throughput.
The reason why the hash-based splitting method obtains better performances is subtle
and depends on the state information that sensors exchange with each other. This state
information is relative to initiated TCP ﬂows, and helps the port scan plugin to avoid
forwarding to the control node for inspection packets belonging to a legitimate connection.
It is easy-understandable that if miscommunication about TCP ﬂow information occurs
among sensors , they will be led into having partial information about initiated connections
and, therefore, will be less conﬁdent in discarding benign traﬃc. In the hash-based splitting
conﬁguration, each sensor is fed with packets that surely belong to the same TCP ﬂow.
Therefore, even though there are communication errors between the sensors, each sensor
will still have the necessary information to decide if a processed packet is benign. In this
case, the sensor will not forward it to the control node, since the check does the packet
belong to any legitimate ﬂow? is done using locally-acquired knowledge only, and not
using knowledge coming from other sensors. It has to be noticed that this situation, in
which sensors have diﬀerent state, contradicts Fact 2, which states that the same scanning
state has to be present on every sensors in the same form, but this is still acceptable,
since Assumption 2, which states that the system does not rely on any predeﬁned mapping
between packets and sensors, and upon which Fact 2 is based, does not hold anymore.
Results are summarized in Table 6.1 and 6.2
Having said that, we have however a proof that the parallel machine can easily keep up
without losing packets to a throughput of 50Mb/s, while, at the same throughput, the single
sensor conﬁguration drops packets and misses the nmap scan 4. This clearly demonstrates
4As reported by other [KVVK02, Der05], we know that 50Mb/s is not the state of the art for intrusion
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Low speed traﬃc High speed traﬃc
(≈ 100Kb/s) (≈ 50Mb/s)
Parallel architecture: 1 sensor 10% heavy packet loss
Parallel architecture: 4 sensors 10% 50%
round-robin traﬃc
Parallel architecture: 4 sensors 10% 10%
hashed traﬃc
Table 6.2: System evaluation results. The tables represents the percentage of the input
throughput that reaches the control node. The parallel architecture with four nodes achieve
the best performance leading to a factor of exploitable parallelization of 10.
the capabilities and the scaling properties of the parallel engine with respect to the single
sensor conﬁguration even though the speciﬁc reasons why the round-robin splitting system
performed badly have not been clariﬁed yet. We further investigate this point in the next
section.
6.4.1 Further considerations on the traﬃc
Further analysis of the traﬃc utilized for our experiments unveiled some pitfalls in the
dataset.
We have noticed that IDEVAL traﬃc is low-throughput, hence the probability of one or
more connections to get interleaved in the dump is rather low. This in turn causes that
the probability for a packet of being adjacent to another packet of the same connection to
be very high.
This result in the fact that, very frequently, the relevant packets for a TCP three-way
handshake are usually close to each other, if not adjacent, in the traﬃc image we used.
Therefore, if the traﬃc is replayed fast, in order to simulate a high-throughput link, and the
splitter performs the round-robin distribution, the relevant packets that modify the TCP
ﬂow state of a sensor for the stream4_reassemble preprocessor will usually get to diﬀerent
sensors. In this situation each sensor hit by a state-change packet will broadcast its match to
other sensors that, in most of the cases, will have already received and processed the other
relevant packets. Since in our setup sensors did not have any INMB they cannot reconstruct
the right order of scanning and therefore, in most of the cases they will result having
a reordered view of the relevant packets for a connection initiation. These reordered
detection speed on a single sensor and we did nothing to tweak sensors in order to increase it. The
emphasis of this work is put on the analysis of the scaling properties of a parallel architecture with respect
to its centralized counterpart. The only assumption that matters here is that both the architectures are
conﬁgured in the same way, no matter if optimized or not, in order to have a common baseline to perform
the comparison.
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packets will then be discarded by the stream4_reassemble, which simulates the TCP
state machine, because they are considered bogus. As a result, the stream4_reassemble
preprocessor misses the newly-initiated ﬂows and the sfportscan preprocessor does not
have enough information to consider following packets as benign since apparently they do
not belong to a legitimateTCP ﬂow.
The above considerations make us understand that replaying a low-throughput traﬃc faster
is not equivalent to replaying real-world, high-throughput traﬃc. In real-world traﬃc, the
physical speed limitations of network links and devices would have prevented that the
packets part of the three-way handshake arrive at the sensors at the same time.
This phenomenon violates our assumption made in 6.3, which states that we suppose that
the state-changing packets are processed by sensors in the right order, and conﬁrms the
importance of having the sensors equipped with an INMB managed as prescribed by the
sloppy rule matching algorithm to simulate a quasi-ordered5 view of unordered events.
5For a true ordered view the exact rule matching algorithm, as described in Chapter 4 is needed.
Chapter 7
Conclusion and Future Work
In the present work we have analyzed the feasibility and described a proof-of-concept
implementation of a parallel, stateful intrusion detection system for high speed networks.
Our work starts in Chapter 1, with an outline of the problem of computer security, in which
we have stressed the ever-increasing importance that this ﬁeld has acquired over time.
In Chapter 2, we have provided an overview of the current solutions to computer security
issues, focusing on misuse network-based intrusion detection. In this analysis, we put the
emphasis on the fact that network speeds have increased faster than the speed of processors,
and therefore, centralized solutions have reached their limit.
In Chapter 3, we have presented an in-depth analysis of the current research on high
speed intrusion detection, underlining the fact that the majority of the solutions proposed
so far are based on custom hardware and cannot be considered as a long-term solution.
In addition, we have stressed that these solutions are not capable of in-depth, stateful
intrusion detection analysis of traﬃc.
In order to overcome those limitations, in Chapter 4 we have proposed a new model based
on the idea of dividing the traﬃc volume into smaller portions that can be thoroughly
analyzed by intrusion detection sensors. This idea is not novel, since it has often been
advocated by the high-performance research community as a way to distribute the service
load across many nodes. The problem with this kind of solution is that any approach that
uses a static partitioning algorithm needs to over-approximate the event space associated
with a signature and, therefore, it is not able to eﬀectively partition the traﬃc in the case
of complex stateful signatures.
The key fact of our model is that the traﬃc partitioning is done without taking into
consideration the signatures used by the intrusion detection sensors; therefore, the sensors
themselves need to coordinate with each others in order to share the information necessary
to detect multi-step attacks. In order to implement this concept, we have proposed a two-
tier architecture composed of a group of intercommunicating sensors and a control node.
We decomposed the stateful actions necessary to evaluate a signature and possibly update
the sensors' state in two parts, one parallelizable and one inherently serial, and proposed
an architecture in which we moved all the non-parallelizable operations to the control node.
By doing this, we were able to exploit the highest possible degree of parallelism. We have
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also proposed a protocol for the communications among sensors and between a sensor and
the control node, and algorithms to support state synchronization. In addition, we have
described a precise characterization of the bottlenecks that are inherent to the parallel
matching system in the most general case.
In Chapter 5 we have provided and discussed an implementation of the proposed architec-
ture based on the Snort intrusion detection engine, and developed optimizations to reduce
the impact of the bottlenecks identiﬁed in the model characterization. The evaluation of
the prototype implementation, described in Chapter 6, has been carried out on both an
emulated and a real-world network environment. The architecture has been deployed on a
real network using four Linux boxes as sensors and it has been tested for port scan detec-
tion in various conﬁgurations. The result of the evaluation have conﬁrmed the validity of
the theoretical model, since the parallel rule matcher, composed of four sensors, has suc-
cessfully outperformed a single Snort instance, which we used as a baseline for comparison,
performing the same kind of detection on the same dataset.
7.1 Future Work
The present work analyzes the problem of stateful high-speed intrusion detection under a
new perspective. The present research in this ﬁeld is based on the assumption that traﬃc
can be sliced in a way that keeps all the evidence necessary for detection in one slice.
Under this assumption, no communication is needed among the sensors.
As stated more than once in this work, we have tried to remove from our model the previous
assumption because many real-world multi-step attacks cannot match those conditions.
The novel model we have taken into consideration provides new solutions but, at the same
time, opens new problems. We sketch limitations and further enhancements about the
model, the architecture, the implementation, and the testing of the proposed system.
In our model, even thought we have been able to parallelize the major bottleneck, which
is the traﬃc scanning process, we still have an inherently serial component, that is, the
control node. The control node processing activities are usually less resource-demanding
than the ones performed on the sensors but they still could become overwhelming for a
single machine. A further improvement of our architecture would be to enhance the parallel
model presented making it capable of distributing the load of control activities on more
than one control node.
A more long-term improvement of the model would require redesigning it based on a strong
characterization of the semantics of the signatures that it will encompass.
As a matter of fact, we have deﬁned our model with performance in mind and in order to
make if ﬁt the known signatures, but it is not guaranteed to satisfy any possible existing
signature. In order to make our system model more general, it would be helpful to construct
it starting from a model of the semantics of attack signatures that systematically enumer-
ates the diﬀerent aspects that characterize attack signatures. In his work [Mei04], Meier
proposes such a model, adapting Zimmer's model [ZU99] to beneﬁt from already-gained
insights in the Active Database domain. The ﬁrst step towards deﬁning a general-purpose
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architecture for parallel intrusion detection should start from enhancing such a kind of
semantic model, identifying in it the inherently non-parallelizable constructs, and extend-
ing them in order to support parallel operations. With such a kind of checklist for the
development of a signature speciﬁcation language in mind, it would be straightforward to
design the parallel system model and architecture. We know that this work would require a
great eﬀort to be accomplished, but it could give a solid basis on which to build a signature
description language implementable, with no additional eﬀorts, on a parallel architecture.
Another task leaved as a future work is to implement and evaluate the exact rule matching
algorithm proposed in Chapter 4 with the same accuracy devoted to the analysis of the
sloppy rule matching algorithm.
Focusing on the implementation of the architecture, even though, as described in Chapter 5,
most of the skeleton of it has been already developed, we implemented only one signature.
Some eﬀorts should be spent in order to implement more rules to match the signatures
provided by Snort in the parallel-enabled architecture. This does not mean that one has
to take into consideration all the Snort rules present in the default ruleset, since those are
stateless and therefore would not require sensors to communicate. Following this consider-
ations, it would be very desirable to have a working rule implementation for co-ordinated
port scans detection tailored on the work described by Gates [Gat06]. Since the event space
of a co-ordinate port scan cannot be partitioned in any way, we could exploit the fact that
our system is oblivious of how the traﬃc is partitioned to eﬀectively implement it. In this
fashion, sensors could be used, as in the proof-of-concept implementation of Chapter 5, to
ﬁlter out benign traﬃc while the complex state required by Gates' algorithm (a heuristic
inspired to the solution of the set coloring problem) could be maintained on the control
node.
Last but not least, the proposed system should be more extensively tested, but, before
doing that, it is necessary to implement more parallel-enabled rules.
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